I just finished reading Yoram Hazoni's article in Commentary Magazine discussing his read of The Emergence of Ethical Man by Rav Joseph B. Sloveitchik. I immediately ordered the book because if Yoram's understanding of it is correct, it is the contemporary Guide for the Perplexed. This article is anyway a must read for anyone interested in a modern perspective and presentation of a very similar approach to how I understand Rambam's outlook on Judaism.
If Hazony is correct the Rav was a pure Maimonidean and all those rumours that he was Nachmanidean should be dispelled.
Thursday, March 22, 2012
Thursday, March 08, 2012
Important Post at Lamalikra.
I have been following this excellent blog for several years and the latest post is amazing. I highly recommend it to anyone who reads Hebrew.
Friday, March 02, 2012
The Laws of Purity, The Core of Torah and Ruach Hakodesh.
Rambam’s introduction to Taharot, which includes the Pirush on the first Perek of Massechet Kelim, is one of the greatest Halachik compositions ever written. It is the work of a virtuoso in his twenties who presents all the rules of Taharot in a concise and organized form which gives the student all the tools necessary to understand the most complex and difficult part of the Talmud. Rambam is quite aware of his accomplishments and as usual we find no false modesty in the writings of the great man. At the end of the introduction he writes:
“… Do not think that these matters are of the same caliber as those I have presented in the earlier Sedarim, for these valuable generalities that I have organized in this introduction were only apprehended by me after I toiled greatly in clarifying each one of them from all perspectives. I collected them “one from a city, two from a family” (an allegory based on Yirmiyahu 3:14 for collecting details from a vast corpus of writings) from all corners of the Talmud and fragments of Braitot and Toseftot, until I have compiled this introduction which is the key to all I want to explain in this Seder…. One will not appreciate the real practical value [of this introduction] until he has toiled days and sleepless nights in one Halacha amongst those at the beginning of Shabbat, Pessachim or Chagigah, Zevachim, Chulin and similar ones and it has not become clear enough for him to rely on his conclusions. He will then read my introduction and the rest [I wrote] and all these matters will now be based on fundamental rules, only then will he appreciate the value of what was accomplished here”.
Earlier Rambam admonishes the reader to read this introduction and the first Perek of Kelim with his Pirush, over and over a thousand times until he memorizes it word for word. In Parah Perek 8 Mishnah 5, he writes: “We already explained this Halacha well in our introduction and if you have memorized what we said [there] verbatim, it requires no further explanation”. Rambam was serious when he admonished the reader to memorize the introduction verbatim!
All this is quite interesting but is not the point of this post. I wanted to focus on a point Rambam makes in the introduction which I believe is revolutionary and is a basis for additional thought and contemplation. Rambam points out that the Rabbis in the Mishnah and Talmud already had great difficulty understanding the rules of Tume’ot and Taharot. He points to a Gemara in Pessachim 17a which discusses the test given by Hagai (2:11-13) to the returning Kohanim during the early times of the Second Temple to make sure they still knew the laws of Purity. The Gemara offers three possibilities in understanding those verses, offered by three of the most prominent Amoraim, Rav, Shmuel and Ravina. Each one had a different understanding of the details of these halachot. Rambam ends this somewhat lengthy exposition and discussion of the three points of view as follows:
“It is now clear that the subject itself [Tume’ot and Taharot] is difficult and was so even in earlier times,. Contemplate about that which they say that the torah at a future time will be forgotten in Israel, and they are referring to the forgetting of the laws of Purity [Tume’ah and Tahara]. So too when the prophet says on this subject ask please the Kohanim Torah - שְׁאַל-נָא אֶת-הַכֹּהֲנִים תּוֹרָהֹ - he refers to the laws of Purity generically and knowing their rules as Torah.”
Rambam is pointing out that the word Torah both in Rabbinic and in the Tanach texts is at times a reference to the laws of Purity. They are so important that they are synonymous with Torah.
“So too have they [the Rabbis] said about Tume’ot and Taharot that they are the core of Torah (see Mishnah Chagigah 1:8). And why not? They are the ladder to Ruach Hakodesh as they say purity brings about holiness etc… (TB Avodah Zara 20b and also at the end of Mishnah Sotah as an interpolated Braita) ”
Rambam sees the rules of purity as a central teaching of Torah and furthermore as a stepping-stone to Ruach Hakodesh, an inspirational basic level of prophecy. How are we to understand this?
Rambam in Hilchot Tume’at Ochlin 16:8 writes:
ט [ח] כל הכתוב בתורה ובדברי קבלה מהלכות הטומאות והטהרות--אינו אלא לעניין מקדש וקודשיו ותרומות ומעשר שני בלבד, שהרי הזהיר את הטמאין מלהיכנס למקדש או לאכול קודש או תרומה ומעשר בטומאה. אבל החולין--אין בהן איסור כלל, אלא מותר לאכול חולין טמאין ולשתות משקין טמאין: הרי נאמר בתורה "והבשר אשר ייגע בכל טמא, לא ייאכל--באש, יישרף" (ויקרא ז,יט)--מכלל שהחולין מותרין, שאינו מדבר אלא בבשר קודשים.
The rules of purity apply only in the Beit Hamikdash and there are no obligatory rules outside it[1] (except of course the laws of Nidah which fall in the same Seder because of the dual aspect of those laws: marital relations and purity). What is the purpose of the laws of purity?
“The twelfth class comprises the laws concerning things unclean and clean. The general object of these laws is, as will be explained by me, to discourage people from [frequently] entering the Sanctuary; in order that their minds are impressed with the greatness of the Sanctuary, and approach it with respect and reverence.” (MN 3:35)
The Beit Hamikdash is a place where we humans who have difficulty with focusing our minds on abstract concepts, have a physical locale on which we can focus our contemplation regarding the existence of God and His role in our existence and our role in His universe. Before we enter the Beit Hamikdash we have to remove ourselves mentally from the day-to-day material life and pursuits so that we can rationally contemplate our existence looking at it dispassionately. It is only when we look at ourselves from this perspective that we can make proper decisions on how to act so that our actions conform to our place and role in God’s universe. The laws of purity create the proper atmosphere that distances us from the mundane. It forces us to become aware of everything we handled recently or came in contact with. It is the proper preparation for the contemplation that is the goal of our visit to the Beit Hamikdash. It is that awareness and realization that sets the proper mood of reverence and respect when entering the Temple which puts us in the proper state of mind to contemplate our existence and our place in the Universe.
What is Ruach Hakodesh? Rabbi Dr. Jose Faur points out that the Hebrew does not connote “holy spirit[2]”, which would be Ruach Hakadosh. Ruach Hakodesh translates as “the spirit that emanates from the Holy”. It is the spirit that emanates from the Beit Hamikdash, the locale that was established to facilitate human contemplation about his relationship with God and His universe and the resulting conclusions. Ruach Hakodesh is not contemplation where the person just meditates about abstract matters, but rather is an action oriented type of meditation.
“The first degree of prophecy consists in the divine assistance which is given to a person, and induces and encourages him to do something good and grand, e.g., to deliver a congregation of good men from the hands of evildoers; to save one noble person, or to bring happiness to a large number of people; he finds in himself the cause that moves and urges him to this deed. This degree of divine influence is called "the spirit of the Lord"; and of the person who is under that influence we say that the spirit of the Lord came upon him, clothed him, or rested upon him, or the Lord was with him, and the like…When Amasa was moved by the Ruach Hakodesh to assist David, "A spirit clothed Amasa, who was chief of the captains, and he said, Thine are we, David," etc.(1 Chron. xii. 18). This faculty was always possessed by Moses from the time he had attained the age of manhood: it moved him to slay the Egyptian, and to prevent evil from the two men that quarreled….This faculty did not cause any of the above-named persons to speak on a certain subject, for it only aims at encouraging the person who possesses it to action; it does not encourage him to do everything, but only to help either a distinguished man or a whole congregation when oppressed, or to do something that leads to that end…. We only apply such phrases to those who have accomplished something very good and grand, or something that leads to that end….” (MN 2:45)
Keeping in mind these ideas as we learn and struggle with the laws of purity, seeing the laws as preparation for unbiased contemplation, a way of making us aware of our obsession with the material aspects of day-to-day life, is a stepping stone to behavior inspired by Ruach Hakodesh, a result of such contemplation. It is indeed this focus on making us aware of our material life and its limitations that gives these laws such importance and at the same time explains why they are so difficult to grasp – they highlight our limitations. These laws are therefore seen as the final stepping stone to action based on Ruach Hakodesh. That is the main purpose of the Torah and all the Mitzvot, for us to act in a way that conforms to God’s universe fulfilling our role in it. The laws of purity are therefore the final step before accomplishing the goal of the Torah; they are at the core of the Torah.
Tuesday, February 28, 2012
"The Source of Faith is Faith Itself", (Harav Aharon Lichtenstein) .
In a discussion with my friend Rabbi Yoni Sacks we disagreed about the meaning of Faith – Emunah. Is Emunah a purely rational process or is a leap of faith required? Can one believe in God based on rational proofs or must one go beyond the rational and involve the intuitive and the emotional? The discussion arose after we both watched the presentation by Harav Aharon Lichtenstein at an event promoting the book Mevakshei Panecha available here starting at about 1:04:00. Rav Lichtenstein states “the source of faith is faith itself”. Rabbi Sacks objected to that statement based on the Rambam’s rational approach to Yediat Hashem – knowing God. I felt otherwise and saw this as an opportunity to clarify my thinking.
We start our daily prayers with the Pessukei Dezimra, the verses of praise, and we introduce the concept of contemplative prayer with verses from King David’s repertoire of poetry and thought. The first chapter we recite (Sfardim the first one indeed, Ashkenazim the first after the introductory blessing – Baruch She‘Amar) is from Divrei Hayamim 1:16 verses 10 and 11 -
י הִתְהַלְלוּ, בְּשֵׁם קָדְשׁוֹ-- {ס} יִשְׂמַח, לֵב מְבַקְשֵׁי יְהוָה. {ר}
10 Glory ye in His holy name; let the heart of them rejoice that seek the LORD.
יא דִּרְשׁוּ יְהוָה, וְעֻזּוֹ-- {ס} בַּקְּשׁוּ פָנָיו, תָּמִיד. {ר}
11 Seek ye the LORD and His strength; seek His face continually.
Those who contemplate God are seekers, they are eternally seeking without any hope of ever finding what they seek - בַּקְּשׁוּ פָנָיו, תָּמִיד – seek His face continually. We humans can never reach the goal we seek of Knowing God – we can only eternally seek Him and by doing so establish in our minds and hearts His presence, without ever really knowing Him. So what is the process of seeking? How does one seek out and spend a lifetime looking for what we know we will never find? The answer is that we have to really understand and absorb why we cannot know Him, why He is so elusive. By understanding why we cannot ever hope to find Him, we develop an abstract sense of Him. The way we arrive at that understanding is by getting to know our own world, our environment, our material surroundings and realize why that cannot be the same category of being that God is. Rambam presents this Mitzvah as follows:
המצווה הראשונה
היא הציווי שנצטווינו בידיעת האלהות, והוא: שנדע שיש (שם) עילה וסיבה, שהיא הפועל לכל הנמצאים.
וזהו אמרו יתעלה: "אנכי ה' אלקיך"
The Mitzvah is to know God, to know that He is the cause for existence. There is no Mitzvah to “prove” His existence – the Mitzvah is to know Him. We are supposed to define Him not prove His existence. So too in Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah when Rambam enumerates the Mitzvot, what is referred to as the short count, he writes
א) לידע שיש שם אלוה
He presents it as knowing that there is an אלוה an attribute that defines God from our perspective as the dominant force that brings and keeps things in existence see MN 2:30[1]. So too in the Halacha itself Yesodei Hatorah 1:1 we read:
א יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות, לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון. והוא ממציא כל הנמצא; וכל הנמצאים מן שמיים וארץ ומה ביניהם, לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת הימצאו.
Again the presentation is not to “prove” that He exists but to know what He is – the First Existent etc… What we are saying is that God is the cause of everything and we know that it is so because it fits with our understanding of the universe we live in. We are further compelled to go one step further and also define exactly what we mean by God –
לפיכך אין אמיתתו כאמיתת אחד מהם. [ד] הוא שהנביא אומר "וה' אלוהים אמת" (ירמיהו י,י)--הוא לבדו האמת, ואין לאחר אמת כאמיתו. והוא שהתורה אומרת "אין עוד, מלבדו" (דברים ד,לה), כלומר אין שם מצוי אמת מלבדו כמותו.
Truth is a word that defines something in relation to something else that is false. Truth is therefore relative. In this case we need to “know” that this is not the case with God. There is no relativity and therefore it is a different type of truth. Understanding this point is the most a human can hope to find in his search for God - that there is no other existent like Him; He is in a category by Himself. We can only know that – that He is NOT like anything else but what He is, is eternally elusive.
“Know that this is really the case, that those who have obtained a knowledge of God differ greatly from each other; for in the same way as by each additional attribute an object is more specified, and is brought nearer to the true apprehension of the observer, so by each additional negative attribute you advance toward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than he who does not negative, in reference to God, those qualities which you are convinced by proof must be negated. There may thus be a man who after having earnestly devoted many years to the pursuit of one science, and to the true understanding of its principles, till he is fully convinced of its truths, has obtained as the sole result of this study the conviction that a certain quality must be negated in reference to God, and the capacity of demonstrating that it is impossible to apply it to Him.” (MN 1:59)
Ultimately the existence of God is a belief because by definition God is unknowable, the only thing we can know about Him is what He is not. How can one prove with scientific and material tools the existence of an entity that does not fall under any category? I must accept “the source of faith is faith itself".
[1] אבל אלוהי השמים 4, וכן אל עולם 3, הוא מבחינת שלמותו יתעלה ושלמותם 15, הרי הוא אלוהים, כלומר: שופט והם נשפטים ולא בעניין משילה 16, כי זה הוא עניין קונה 2, אלא הוא מבחינת השפעתו יתעלה במציאות 17 והשפעתם 18, הרי הוא האלוה לא הם, כלומר: השמים.
Tuesday, January 17, 2012
Reading Mevakshei Panecha - Part 4 - Final - the Holy of Holies of a Person - Emunah.
The last chapter of Mevakshei Panecha I found fascinating. It is entitled “The Holy of Holies of a Person” and it is a response to a Rav Sabato question to Rav Lichtenstein about faith. The first paragraph I believe is probably the most important one and really defines the idea of Emunah – faith – in a rational Jew.
“You want to talk about my Emunah in God? Is that what you want? That is the Holy of Holies of man! That is his Inner Sanctum! That is the most intimate of intimacies!”
We can talk about God, what we think He is, try to define him in words but ultimately we are just walking around a wall that can never be breached by an outsider. The paradox of Emunah is that we work and spend a lifetime searching for God in our surrounding but ultimately we find Him in the silence of the self. Rambam in MN 1:50 when he begins the chapters that discuss God’s attributes and how we can understand them without violating God’s unity (uniqueness) he introduces the subject with the following statement:
כאשר תפשוט מעליך את התאוות והמנהגים17 ותהיה בעל הבנה ותתבונן במה שאגיד בפרקים הבאים על שלילת התארים - תהיה לך בהכרח ודאות בעניין זה, אזי תהיה מאלה המציירים לעצמם18 את יִחוד השם ולא מאלה האומרים אותו בפיהם מבלי לציירו לעצמם19, שהללו בבחינת מי שנאמר עליהם: קרוב אתה בפיהם ורחוק מכִליותיהם (ירמיה י"ב, 2)19. אלא צריך אדם להיות בבחינת מי שמציירים להם את האמת ומשיגים אותה, אף אם אין הם מבטאים אותה, כמו שנצטוו אנשי המעלה ונאמר להם: אִמרו בלבבכם על משכבכם ודֹמו סלה (תהלים ד', 5)20.
Renounce desires and habits, follow your reason, and study what I am going to say in the chapters which follow on the rejection of the attributes; you will then be fully convinced of what we have said: you will be of those who truly conceive the Unity of God, not of those who utter it with their lips without thought, like men of whom it has been said, "Thou art near in their mouth, and far from their reins" (Jer. xii. 2). It is right that a man should belong to that class of men who have a conception of truth and understand it, though they do not speak of it. Thus the pious are advised and addressed, "Commune with your own heart upon your bed and be still. Selah." (Ps. iv. 5.)
Clearly Rav Lichtenstein has internalized Rambam’s admonition. A singular and unique entity which cannot be sensed with human senses, cannot be conceived with human mind, can only be intuited through inductive and deductive reasoning, such an entity cannot be verbalized outside the self, and that is true Emunah. Contemplating this brings us to an understanding of Negative Knowledge which is the key of Rambam’s thought in this matter. See my article here .
Rav Lichtenstein then proceeds to discuss the subject in a general without getting into specifics. First he addresses a well-known thought that I grew up with and always made me uncomfortable.
“Rav Elhanan Wasserman said that faith [in God] is simple and easy. However the Yetzer Hara interferes and keeps man from worshipping God. I do not accept these words. Firstly, to my mind, that is factually untrue. Secondly, this argument is somewhat insulting. It argues that were it not for bad urges, others too would aspire to faith. True that our natural senses may bring a person to believe, but to argue that it is easy and simple, were it not for our urges, I cannot agree with that. A certain effort is required for one to arrive at belief. The concept of faith is complex. Specifically, one cannot give one answer that one can say with certainty that it will convince every denier.”
Rav Lichtenstein makes two points that always bothered me about Rav Elhanan’s approach. He says that Emunah is self-evident. If it were so why does every thinking person struggle with it? He also accuses those who don’t accept it succumb to their bad urges. We know many ethical and moral people who have no Emunah.
“When I teach a Sugya –subject - and offer two possibilities as potential explanations, I tell my students, don’t forget that there also is a third possibility; both explanations are correct. Not always must we accept one position and refute the other. In Halachik sugyot it is possible that the resolution depends on circumstances. At times we will rely on one principle and others on another. So too with Emunah one cannot say that it all depends on one argument only. There different perspectives; from a historical and national one I find myself turning to a certain aspect of my personality while for other perspectives I turn to others.”
Rav Lichtenstein then spells out some of what I would term conflicting perspectives. We have to accept that certain truths and arguments that were considered axiomatic during the Middle Ages are no longer applicable. On the other hand reliance on subjective experiences does not work for many and triggers many questions.
“The historical perspective has two sides to it. Some people are inspired by it and it strengthens their Emunah while to others the historical perspective itself is the source of doubt. To anything you tell them they find analogies elsewhere, in the Caribbean or Antarctica. Of course the strongest historical proof is the contemplation of Jewish history and the wondrous survival of the Jewish nation against all odds, one lamb amongst seventy wolves. That strengthens one’s Emunah. The impetus for religious Emunah is multi-faceted; learning Torah, relying on the Tradition of generations, contemplation of the universe and its perfection, the Historical record and the personal instinct and experience. I hope that we don’t have to choose amongst these. I believe that they are all interdependent each supporting the other. In such a setup, some things are more central and important than others but altogether they lead us to experience Emunah without us having to choose one over the other.”
Rav Lichtenstein is talking about Emunah very generally without specifying a particular question or particular subject of belief. During the Middle Ages, basing themselves on the science of the times, the Rishonim felt that certain issues of belief can be proven scientifically while others were based on what I refer to as “plausibility” when taking into account all aspects of an issue. Rambam in MN spends several chapters in the beginning of Part 2 differentiating between the different types of arguments for the existence of God and His unity which he bases on what he considered as scientifically objective arguments while will, creation from nothingness and prophecy are based on plausibility rather than irrefutable proofs. Plausibility is based on a combination of various related propositions that support a certain point of view. This approach is used in matters that are beyond human comprehension, areas that humans cannot experience with their senses and is generally referred to as metaphysical questions. Considering the current state of scientific knowledge, Rav Lichtenstein seems to use the latter argument, the argument from plausibility as the basis for his understanding of Emunah. He also emphasizes that the process of searching, learning and contemplating these issues brings one closer to HKBH and ultimately Emunah becomes a combination of the rational and the experiential – the experiential being internalized and personal which does not lend itself to verbalization.
I highly recommend for anyone that has the fortitude and facility with the Hebrew language, to work his way through this very interesting, challenging and enlightening book. We need to take advantage and appreciate the few great talmidei Chachamim and thinkers in our community – and unfortunately they are few and precious.
In Memory of My Mother A’H who’s Yahrzeit is today the 22nd of Tevet.
Monday, January 09, 2012
Reading Mevakshei Panecha - Part 3 - Leadership For Our Community.
Continuing with the interview of Rav Lichtenstein in Mevakshei Panecha, Rav Sabato asks him about leadership as part of a general discussion about educating Talmidei Chachamim:
“This question, whether a Talmid Chacham should grow exclusively in Torah or should he also be involved in leadership matters, is a difficult question in our generation. Look at Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ZL; there is no other in our generation like him. It will take a long time until we find another such great. One of the things that were outstanding about him was that although he expressed himself here and there about communal issues, he refused to be involved in leadership issues. I had many conversations with him about a variety of issues and he used to tell me: I don’t want to deal with this. On the other hand there are other Gedolim in Torah who took upon themselves this responsibility because of how important it was to them. If Rav Shlomo Zalman is one kind of figure amongst Gedolim, Rav Elayashiv is completely a different kind.
It is clear that we need great people but there is a great distance between being a great man (Gadol) and a leader. In great measure in the Chareidi world, notwithstanding all the due respect and appreciation for what they accomplish in the field of learning, those who become the heads of the community, don’t know the world around them and that is no coincidence as they are trained not to. They are taught that there is no point in dealing with anything that does not enter the world of the Beit Hamidrash and then they expect these same people who were taught not to notice their surroundings to become leaders? They should tell us how to behave [in the world outside]? No wonder that in our era this road is strewn with failure!
If one devotes time, significant time, dealing with external matters one gets to know reality, and knowing reality does not mean knowing the gizzard of a chicken for the purpose of ruling Hilchot treifot. It means to know in depth the soul of the nation, the community. I believe that they say in the name of the Chazon Ish that in the area of psak there is a greater risk of improperly understanding the circumstances of the case than in misreading the Halacha. (Rav Sabato points to Iggrot Chazon Ish letter 31). For many there is not enough understanding of what it means to know reality. They look at technical areas, one learning about electricity another about medicine. Of course one cannot rule certain halachot in Hilchot Shabbat without knowing a little physics, medicine etc… but this is far from enough. To deal with issues of values, those things that are on the agenda of the community, those issues that engage the community, one has to arrive to a certain depth in understanding the psyche of the individual, the nation and that requires investment, significant investment. The truth is that it is hard to see on the horizon personalities that will become such people in the future. I do not see a Rav Shlomo Zalman sprouting here [in Eretz Israel]. While in the Lakewood Yeshiva, with all the investment that is there and with all its glory, it is hard for me to see a new Rav Aharon Kotler coming out of there. They are around several decades and so far one has not emerged.
It is possible that it is our fate to get used to a different kind of leadership and preparation for leadership. This getting used to is difficult. Who does not want a leader like the Chafetz Chaim?
I do not see in our own group anyone like the Rav ZL. There are many Talmidei Chachamim who are Lamdanim with breadth and depth but a leader par excellence is missing….”
Rav Aharon Lichtenstein makes an interesting point about leadership in our community. He does not belittle the advantages of Torah leadership but it has to be someone prepared for the task by being deeply involved in real life outside the Beit Hamidrash. He does not subscribe to the school that believes that a lifelong Torah scholar somehow miraculously gains insights into the workings of the community and world outside. The required external involvement may come at the cost of some Talmud Torah but it is necessary and only then can we rely on such a leader. It is interesting that he does not see this kind of leadership emerging in any of the groups that make up the community of observant Jews. He does not however address enough the underlying causes for the lack of this type of leadership. By including his own group, who are active in the world outside the Beit Hamidrash, amongst those lacking the necessary leadership traits, he leaves us with a sense of helplessness and even despair.
Monday, January 02, 2012
Reading Mevakshei Panecha - Part 2 - How Should Religious Jews Relate To Secular Ones?
In another chapter of the book Mevakshei Panecha, Rav Lichtenstein and Rav Sabato discuss the attitude religious Jews should have towards secular Jews. This issue is very pertinent today, especially with the painful and disturbing occurrences we read and hear about in Bet Shemesh and earlier in Jerusalem. Rav Sabato introduces the subject, presenting the two dominant points of view, that of Rav Kook and the Chazon Ish that seem to be the most accepted opinions in the religious community. Rav Kook holds that considering that the secular Jews were the leaders of the Zionistic enterprise and the builders of the land, they apparently were suffused with a national spirit of love and dedication to their fellow Jews. Such a total dedication to the Jewish nation stems from a deep-rooted Jewishness that is implanted in their soul. These traits will eventually blossom as the process of return to Zion continues and eventually move towards Torah study and Mitzvot. The second position is that of the Chazon Ish (not necessarily contradictory) that the secular Jews are “Tinokot Shenishbu” prisoners of their circumstances, and therefore cannot be blamed for their misguided ways. Rav Lichtenstein disagrees with both approaches.
“In both narratives there is a certain judgment, a certain statement of fact, a general categorization of the public in question. I have no idea how one can think in such a way. We are talking about a large public. The spiritual content and the values of a part of that public include powerful ideas, important ones that contain meaningful values, not necessarily historical ones. At the same time, to our great sorrow, there is a part of that public that is empty and frivolous, who shook off not only Torah and Mitzvot, Mikvah or Kashrut, but also values that are important to us as Jews and others that are universal… Therefore, I don’t want to pass judgment on the whole lifestyle of that public, nor do I think that I can… If we want to judge a certain individual within a certain public, there are things that irritate us, but there are also certain things that definitely are attainments and values that I wish we were at their level… If we relate to them as Tinokot Shenishbu we do not give them any credit, we don’t find anything of value worth emulating, we assume that they have no meaningful spiritual or moral value, as the [famous] definition by the Chazon Ish [comparing them] to an empty wagon. To say that they are an “empty wagon” infers that they don’t have anything of value, nothing that is not better in our community. I believe that in actuality that is incorrect and I am not interested in going to that place.”
Rav Lichtenstein explains that the totally negative image that we have of the secular community is a result of our defending against being drawn in by them.
“I repeat: I don’t believe that is the reality. There are amongst them very charitable people, people who care deeply for the future, the path and the survival of the Jewish community – at the communal level not only the national. My vision is not theirs. But there are many things that they are building and doing, not only in the areas of state where they have a historical role which is the perspective of Rav Kook, they also have value systems that are meaningful. Saying that they are Tinokot Shenishbu is infantilizing this public. Saying they are Tinokot Shenishbu is saying that they have no value but it is “nebbish” not their fault. I have no doubt that there are such people amongst them just as there are also amongst us… I also see an element of Tinokot Shenishbu in the Rav Kook approach not only in the Chazon Ish one. I am referring to his attitude to the secular group that says: you think that you are such and such, but we know that deep inside you there is another universe. That universe is your real internal self. One day that self will be uncovered, as you remove layer after layer of skin. They see this as layers of an onion. This attitude is arrogant. I would object if I was the subject of this attitude and I don’t believe one should relate to them in this way.”
Rav Lichtenstein very astutely puts his finger on one of the least attractive aspects of the religious view of the other. There is a sense of self satisfaction, a feeling that I am doing what is right while the other, who does not follow the Mitzvot, is missing out on this great good and the only reason they are doing so is because of ignorance. Of course, this attitude does not promote feelings of mutual respect and good will. Rav Lichtenstein blames or rather tries to mitigate the accusation of arrogance by blaming it on self-preservation. There is no question that it plays a role but ultimately it puts down anyone that is different. It also refuses to see much of the good and values of the other which at times is superior to those found in our community. I was watching a video a few days ago where one of the crazies in Beit Shemesh was yelling at the police and the journalists saying to them “you are going to teach us values? You?” Of course this guy was nuts and abhorrent but crazy people sometimes voice what others in his community think. Indeed, many of the reactions of the rabbinical organs e.g. Agudah, condemned the public behavior but not the underlying arrogance and dismissal of the other.
“The vision of Rav Kook I understand. At times I am even jealous of him. At times. The vision he expresses, I have problems with to a great extent, because I see in it – and I hope I don’t misread – a preference of the historical over the moral. This vision praises the attainments and the mission that these people fulfill in the physical world; but what about [their accomplishments in] the intellectual realm?”
Rav Lichtenstein is critical of Rav Kook’s approach because he understands that he refuses to see the good values that the secular community brings to the table. Rav Kook sees them as tools in the hand of HKBH to serve the Klal but does not give them credit for what they really offer in terms of the intellectual and spiritual.
So what is Rav Lichtenstein’s own position?
“It is very important that we do not under any circumstances arrive at the conclusion that we have no regard to select values that exist in segments of the secular public. There are people in the religious community, and not only in the religious one, that have an attitude of - either you are [totally] with us or against us. I believe that a Jewish moral perspective based on torah should recognize imperfect value systems too. If I am out to build an ideology, whether a personal one or for a community, I build it on a purely Holy basis. On the other hand, if I ask myself: let us say that this person, this group or that group, are anyway not keeping Shabbat, they don’t go to the Mikvah, is there no difference from our perspective - not from theirs - if a Jew hates Torah or loves it, or whether he has a warm spot for it, even if this is not enough to make him observe the Shulchan Aruch? … Every one of us has had the experience that when a member of the family becomes non-observant, at times there are confrontations. What is the point of the confrontation? People have family members who they know will not return to become Shabbos observant halachikally, it is however important to us that they should have a warm spot in their heart [for torah] not only so that should they become members of the Knesset they will vote favorably for women serving in Sherut Leumi [instead of the army – DG] but because we pray and wish that our whole community remain healthy both spiritually and physically and that includes regard for select values.”
Rav Lichtenstein makes here a very important point. We all have a tendency to look at others from the perspective of our own values. Anybody that sees things differently is judged on that basis. We see our own values as ideal and look askance at values that we do not have. That prevents us from objectively evaluating and adapting some of these values, those that are meaningful and important. Our attitude further creates a rift between us and the secular public which prevents them from appreciating what we bring to the table. We have to look at ourselves as a whole, the religious and secular community as one, and respect the values found in both communities. The risk to this approach is that we see all values as relative rather than absolute.
“However, I do not agree with some of my colleagues who say: “listen, not everybody is perfect. We are not mindful of this and they are not mindful of something else. They don’t keep Shabbat and we are lax in other things. I do not buy this approach. True, we all are not perfect, but what is missing, how much is missing and are the attempts to fix our shortcomings sincere? That is a much more meaningful [criteria].”
There are indeed Jewish values that are important to us. The external values are meaningful but are even more so if added to our own values rather than replacing them. In other words, Rav Lichtenstein does not want us to misunderstand that his appreciation for external values should allow for them to replace our own values. They are a welcome and necessary addition and they will only be available to us if we look at them objectively and with the due respect.
“This approach to a partial value system is not exclusive to our relationship with the secular community. It is also useful in our relationship with the Conservative and Reform movements everywhere. And I repeat over and over, I value very much the incomplete value system and hope and pray that I can advance with people towards the goal of their internalizing more and more of the world of our values”.
In other words Rav Lichtenstein sees great value in the cross-pollination of the different value systems in the Jewish community. To allow for that to happen both communities have to show respect for each other although in the eyes of each the value system of the other is incomplete and imperfect. An all or nothing approach is not constructive for both parties.
Tuesday, December 27, 2011
Reading Mevakshei Panecha - Part 1 - Secular Knowledge and The Torah Jew
My Israeli friend Mechel recently gave me as a gift the book Mevakshei Panecha, an interview of Rav Aharon Lichtenstein by Rav Chaim Sabato. It is not an easy read although Rav Sabato is a writer par excellence. Rav Lichtenstein has developed the dialectical method to an art form and some chapters leave the reader in a state of confusion – at least that was the case with me. The effort to read is however well worth it as we get a glimpse of the workings of a great mind and a Gadol Betorah, one of the greatest of our time. I am about half way through the book and I want to share/discuss some points that I found enlightening and interesting. As the book is in Hebrew, I will translate the pertinent excerpts.
In a chapter discussing how to relate to values that come to us from outside the Torah:
“There are people including gentiles whose historical mission is one of creativity – literary or moral creativity. These are people that you see in them greatness whether greatness of the soul or moral greatness. How can one not be impressed with Samuel Johnson ? A man who started life in the London gutter and climbed to a level of Gemilat Chassadim that I wish I could reach. Should I ignore this just because he was a gentile? …. What nobility, what fear of heaven and dedication are projected and the final lines of the wondrous sonata of Milton regarding his blindness! Why should I ignore this?”
We are not talking about TIDE (Torah im Derech Eretz) which is generally seen as a utilitarian approach to secular studies but rather a fundamental appreciation of that knowledge and the creativity found in that world. An appreciation that sees it as part of the basic education needed to make us into perfected human beings and Jews. However Rav Lichtenstein does set some limitations.
“One has to differentiate between the ideal and the practical. In practice, one must be careful when importing values from the outside by looking at two issues. One issue is self-suspicion. When I am searching for values outside the Torah I must ask myself: what propels me to look for universal values? Why am I not looking for them in our own sources? Am I truly looking? Is the search occurring only after I have fully evaluated everything that is written in the Torah about these values without finding them, to the point of having to look outside? Is there another reason that I am compelled to look in places other than the Torah? … The second issue one must investigate is where these external values come from. Are they possibly coming from sources that from our standpoint are unreliable and unwanted? Having concluded these two analyses I find myself confronting a universal question and not necessarily a Jewish one. It is told that the Caliph Omar Ibn Hatab, one of the famous Caliphs in the middle Ages ordered the burning of the famous great library in Alexandria. He argued that if what is written in this library is true it must be found in the Koran and if it is not found there it must be false…”
Rav Lichtenstein subtly points out that the standard Yeshiva world argument that anything not found in the Torah must be false is an old argument developed by other religions. As he points out further this argument was quite common in 17th century England between the Puritans and their more enlightened opponents. Rav Lichtenstein then fleshes out the immediate questions one has to confront when going out to look for external values. First we have to determine how well grounded the person that embarks on the search is. Is he easily swayed or is he self-confident and has a firm footing in his thinking?
“We then have to focus on two additional issues. One is the environment the person is in. When I say environment I refer to two things. First is to analyze the social, financial and cultural environments. The whole environment could be so different from what it once was, that the sources do not address the current situation. We have to however caution; the fact that the circumstances changed does not mean that one has to automatically expect a changed stand. Not every circumstantial change forces us to modify our thinking or outlook. But we must at least be aware of the changed circumstances. I always ask myself whether the situation I am in now is a mirror of the situation and circumstances that is presented in the words of Chazal and the Rishonim. Second, even if the environment has not changed, I have to ask are the tools that I have now different than those that were available to the past. And even if there is no change in either the circumstances or the tools, sometimes there is a change in the weltanschauung that I have to things, which may not be exactly the same it was once….”
Rav Lichtenstein is very sensitive to the changes that have occurred over time and the effect they have on how we look at them from the Torah viewpoint. We cannot let the Torah viewpoint become ossified to the point of making it irrelevant. Rav Sabato asks him if his father in law, RYBS Z”L was influenced by external sources.
“A certain person once asked me if Rav Soloveitchik was influenced by Kierkegaard. I understand that one who asks this question does so with a critical undertone, as if saying that should the Rav have been influenced by Kierkegaard, woe is to us! I answered him that if the question was whether the Rav read Kierkegaard, of course he did! But if the question was did he take anything from him? I don’t know for sure but I suspect the answer is positive too. Of course, a great person like the Rav, who learned Torah all his life, who is rooted in its world, its opinions and its values – such a person when he is confronted by a book by Kierkegaard, if after a careful inspection he discovers that the things he read in there are true, moral and deepen our understanding of divine worship, does he have to ignore them? Does he have to turn away from them? Why? Just because they are based on Kierkegaard? If the notion is true, he will take it and if not he will ignore it, not because it comes from Kierkegaard but because it is wrong... There is a problem that many people nowadays have, including Yeshiva students. They lack the ability to dive into stormy seas. They live in a world of fear. They are afraid of everything. A part of the Yeshiva world suffers from this disability. True, in some matters they are right, but in many other things, and not necessarily literary matters, they are not right…”
Rav Lichtenstein interestingly starts the discussion by setting very clear parameters. One has to analyze and be suspicious of one’s motives. We first have to explore the whole Torah and try to find an answer to the existential question that is intriguing the searcher. He then admits that there are contemporary matters and issues that because of the environment, the culture, the tools we now have, cannot be solved by ignoring external sources. And then he turns to the Rav and how he did take out good ideas from secular culture and introduced them into Judaism. The way I read the progression of his thought is that people of the caliber of the Rav are able to independently fish in the deep waters of secular thought and find the kernels of truth that advance the thinking of a modern Jew living in our world today. He does not say it, but it is clear that he sees himself as capable of doing the same. Lesser scholars and other interested students can then study their insights which help them navigate the contemporary cultural currents. The Yeshivot are so afraid of possible deviance that they prohibit even that, thus restricting their members from fully participating in the contemporary world. As we will see further, this respect for truth from whatever its source leads Rav Lichtenstein to a unique and extremely enlightening perspective on the secular Jews of our time. I will write about that in an upcoming post.
Sunday, December 04, 2011
Reb Zadok on Attribution -
“For this apprehension is an emanation from above to prophets through prophetic processes and to sages through Ruach Hakodesh, each apprehending according to the status of his knowledge, apprehension and personal perfection. Moshe rabbeinu in his vision of the burning bush first and his later vision when God passed all His goodness in front of him, was shown God’s true unity. However, unlike Yechezkel he did not see the chariots, the Chayot and the Ofanim; he had other visualizations according to his status…. These different visualizations varied according to each sage amongst them Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai [the protagonist of the Zohar] whose visualizations varied at different times. So too in the Sefer Habahir attributed to rabbi Nechunya ben Hakana, and Sefer Hatemunah, attributed to rabbi Ishmael the High priest, other visualizations are found where they speak in a completely different vein. So too the kabbalah of the Geonim that we find in the Pardes and other holy books, a selection of which is reprinted in a small sefer named “Selection of Kabbalah from Geonim” (Warsaw edition), a reader may notice that it is a totally different approach to kabbalah then what is found in Sefer Hazohar and its companions. That is so because it is based on the vision that was experienced by one of the Geonim, the head of their school …. There is also is printed a sefer Mayan Hachochma that is attributed to Moshe rabbeinu which is also quoted in Pardes, Pelach Harimon, in the introduction to Sefer Emek Hamelech and others. It appears to me that it is accepted by the earlier sages that it is a holy book and it seems to me that it was written in the days of the later Geonim or close to that time by one holy person who through his Ruach Hakodesh was able to apprehend what Moshe rabbeinu did receive from Sinai (!) for a Chacham is greater than a prophet as Ramban in Baba Batra 12a writes see there as quoted in Ayin Yaakov. The beginning of that sefer is already found in sefer Haiyun by Rav Chamai Gaon parts of which is printed in the above mentioned Selection. It is also mentioned in sefer Hakana etc… It seems to me that Sefer Haiyun was in front of the author of sefer Mayan Hachochma and he followed along the same path a little though we find many additional novel things that he apprehended during his own contemplation. For those who visualize the Chariot do it via Ruach Hakodesh gained through knowledge and rational thought, which is however supplemented by superhuman apprehension emanating from above through Ruach Hakodesh as explained by Ramban… ”
Reb Zadok is referring to Ramban who explains the Gemara that Nevuah no longer exists, as limiting it to prophetic visions however Ruach Hakodesh that accompanies knowledge of great sages still continues to exist. Reb Zadok explains that to be a supplemental insight that emanates from HKBH and that is Ruach Hakodesh. I have attached a scan of the pertinent page in the original Sefer Hazichronot.
This is a fascinating concept developed by a Chassidic Rebbe who was also a great scholar and thinker and who had a very keenly developed critical sense. He discerns the different schools of Kabbalistic thought. The amazing thing is that he understands that Kabbalah is a personal experience rather than something that is transmitted. There seems to be a basic philosophical thinking that goes back to antiquity but is reinterpreted by each visionary according to his personal state of mind and thinking. That tradition of personal intuition and insight seems to go back to the prophets all the way to Moshe rabbeinu. A sefer attributed to an earlier sage may be written by someone else at a later date and attributed to the earlier person if it supposedly was based on his thinking. Is that what happened to the Zohar? Was it Rav Moshe de Leon’s insights according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai? Reb Zadok does not say so but can we infer so from his way of thinking?
Monday, November 14, 2011
Circumcision and Child Sacrifice - Some Fascinating Parallels.
In 2006 (scary! my blog is over 5 years old) I posted this re the Akeida and it generated quite a few interesting comments at the time. To my surprise and I have to admit satisfaction my old posts are read and relevant five years later as I received a thoughtful email commenting on it. The comment triggered some further thoughts on the subject and here they are.
In the earlier post I explained my understanding of Rambam that Avraham was having internal debates about his dedication to God. The question that I did not address is why did his introspection lead to a vision that manifested a human sacrifice? The same thinking could have found other visions that are less jarring that would demonstrate his devotion. Apparently, the idea of sacrificing a child, especially a first born, was very much the custom of the time and that is where Avraham got this idea in his vision. Neviim are realists who live within their time and culture and their vision is formed by that reality.
To expand on this theme - the haftorah to this week’s Parsha is the story in Melachim 2:4 about the Shunamit woman who was helped by Elisha and gave birth to a son whom she almost lost later - a similar theme to Abraham's experience with Yitzchak. That is usually the case with Haftorot; they have some connection to the Parsha that is read before it. What most people miss in our Haftorah is the shouting silence that is heard by what is not read - the end of the story just preceding this one, Melachim 2:3:26-27.
כו וַיַּרְא מֶלֶךְ מוֹאָב, כִּי-חָזַק מִמֶּנּוּ הַמִּלְחָמָה; וַיִּקַּח אוֹתוֹ שְׁבַע-מֵאוֹת אִישׁ שֹׁלֵף חֶרֶב, לְהַבְקִיעַ אֶל-מֶלֶךְ אֱדוֹם--וְלֹא יָכֹלוּ.
26 And when the king of Moab saw that the battle was too sore for him, he took with him seven hundred men that drew sword, to break through unto the king of Edom; but they could not.
כז וַיִּקַּח אֶת-בְּנוֹ הַבְּכוֹר אֲשֶׁר-יִמְלֹךְ תַּחְתָּיו, וַיַּעֲלֵהוּ עֹלָה עַל-הַחֹמָה, וַיְהִי קֶצֶף-גָּדוֹל, עַל-יִשְׂרָאֵל; וַיִּסְעוּ, מֵעָלָיו, וַיָּשֻׁבוּ, לָאָרֶץ. {פ}
27 Then he took his eldest son that should have reigned in his stead, and offered him for a burnt-offering upon the wall. And there came great wrath upon Israel; and they departed from him, and returned to their own land. {P}
The rabbis, quoted ad locum by Rashi and Redak explain that the King of Moab asked his advisers, what merits Israel has, that it deserves such miracles which help them in battle. His advisers told him that their forefather Abraham offered his firstborn as a sacrifice when God asked him to do so. The king of Moab therefore did the same and sacrificed his own firstborn. God was angry because it contrasted the devotion that this man had to his god with Israel’s lack of the same as Israel was sacrificing their sons to strange gods which their own God forbade. The rabbis clearly connected the two – the popular custom of child sacrifice and the Akeida. Although it is very much the theme of the Parsha, the Haftorah starts immediately after these verses, skipping them because of God's wrath but the elephant is in the room for one who knows Tanach or bothers to look up the Haftorah in a Tanach.
There is a further connection of child sacrifice to the Mitzvah of Brit Milah. It is quite plausible that one of the reasons[1] for the Mitzvah of Milah is that it was meant as a replacement for human sacrifice, letting blood instead of killing the child. Symbolically the bloodletting is performed on the organ that is responsible for reproduction and future generations - that which this sacrifice, if it had been performed was precluding. In fact, the story of the birth of Yitzchak and subsequently the Akeida follow the instructions Avraham received about the Brit Milah. The Torah is telling us that after the commandment of Milah, child sacrifice has no place in religion. The Mitzvah of Mila that is performed at birth replaces it and if additional manifestations of devotion to God are needed, replace a human sacrifice with one of animals – the ram being a symbol for Korbanot.
The Bracha we make during the Brit Mila is (MT Hilchot Mila 3:3):
ואחר כך מברך אבי הבן, או המל, או אחד מן העומדין שם ברכה זו--ברוך אתה ה' אלוהינו מלך העולם, אשר קידש ידיד מבטן, וחוק בשארו שם, וצאצאיו חתם באות ברית קודש
The words קידש ידיד מבטן, are quite possibly a reference to the ancient cultural custom of child sacrifice. I heard this suggestion close to 30 years ago by Professor Haim Gevaryahu at the Brit Milah of one of his grandsons. I subsequently found it online with an attribution to him by his son Gilad Gevaryahu with a reference to the source for this conjecture.
Philo of Byblos (64-141 A.D.) described a ritual in Canaanite religion as follows:
Among ancient peoples in critically dangerous situations it
was customary for the rulers of a city or nation, rather than
lose everyone, to give over the dearest of their children as a
propitiatory sacrifice to the avenging deities. The children
thus given up were slaughtered according to a secret ritual.
Now Kronos, whom the Phoenicians call El, who was king of
their land and who was later divinized––after his death––as
the star of Kronos, had an only son by a local bride named
Anobret (and therefore they called him Yedid1; even now
among the Phoenicians the only son is given this name); when
war’s gravest danger gripped the land, he [Kronos] dressed
his son in royal attire, prepared an altar, and sacrificed him.
(Harold W. Attridge and Robert A. Oden, Jr., Philo of Byblos
The Phoenician Histroy: Introduction, Critical Text, Notes.
Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series 9. Washington,
D. C.: Catholic Biblical Association, 1981: 61–62.)
See also a post I wrote a few years ago.
Friday, November 11, 2011
Rav Gedalia Nadel Z"L on the Rule of the Majority.
As I am learning Hilchot Ma’achalot Assurot with my chavruta and we are reaching the chapters that deal generally with Ta’aruvot, mixtures of forbidden and permitted foods, we decided to go over a shiur that Rav Gedaliah Nadel (RGN) gave in Kolel Chazon Ish on the subject of Rove – the rule of the majority. The shiur is printed in Rav Shailat’s Betorato Shel Rav Gedaliah and was approved by him. We found it to be very helpful. I will present here in my own words my understanding of his approach. I think it is important to see how a real original Torah thinker deals with a complex subject and I am hoping that I will learn something myself working through the issue this way.
There is an accepted basic general rule in cases of mixtures of forbidden and permitted foods, Issur and Heter that according to torah law (de’oraita) the minority is subsumed by the majority - -
מדאורייתא ברובא בטיל (TB Chulin 98b) . The rule (Bitul henceforth) has many detailed variations and arguments among the rabbis as to its application, whether it applies to all mixtures, whether they are of the same type of food or also when two different types are mixed together, does it apply to both dry with dry and wet with wet (liquids) mixtures and so on. The idea behind this rule is, as explained by Rosh (Chulin chapter 7 letter 37) that although when a mixture of Issur and Heter occurs, for example one piece of unslaughtered meat among two kosher pieces, we know that the forbidden meat is present and logically we would say that when one picks one piece to eat there is a possibility that it is the forbidden one and considering that neveila is an Issur Torah, a safek (when the Issur is not known) would be prohibited. The Torah however tells us (Gezeirat Hakatuv) that we consider it as if the Issur became Heter and we can even eat the whole mixture. In other words not only are we allowed to eat each piece on its own, but we may even eat the whole all at once (e.g. eat all the pieces) where the prohibited is necessarily also consumed.
The question is what is the source of this rule? If it is a Gezeirat Hakatuv where is it found in the Torah? Rashi in Chulin says that it is based on the verse in Shemot 23:2
לֹא-תִהְיֶה אַחֲרֵי-רַבִּים, לְרָעֹת; וְלֹא-תַעֲנֶה עַל-רִב, לִנְטֹת אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים--לְהַטֹּת.
Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; neither shalt thou bear witness in a cause to turn aside after a multitude to pervert justice;
I will not go here into a discussion about the plain meaning of the verse versus the Midrash; suffice it to say that the Rabbis read the last three words אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים—לְהַטֹּת as telling a court, a Beit Din to decide according to the majority rule (see the first Mishnah in Sanhedrin 2a). Rashi is telling us that the rule that we follow the majority in a court ruling can be extended to Bitul. But where is the similarity? A court is trying to determine the truth. There is only one truth and the Torah tells us that we must accept the truth as seen by the majority. The other opinion is therefore not the truth; it is wrong, null and void and therefore non-existent. In a mixture, the prohibited food remains there though only in a minority, but it is present in some quantity. How does the unslaughtered meat become slaughtered meat? More surprising yet, is that we do not find this comparison in the Gemara. It is only the Rishonim who develop this comparison between courts and food mixtures. The Rosh as we saw sees this as a Gezeirat Hakatuv which traditionally is understood to be a rule that does not necessarily have a rational explanation. Had the Rabbis in the Talmud told us that it is so we would have been forced to accept it and assume that it is a tradition going back to Moshe, but how can Rishonim develop an irrational comparison?
There is a Gemara that, at first blush, seems to tie the rule of majority in courts to other Halachik situations of Rove. The Gemara in Chulin 11a says:
מנא הא מילתא דאמור רבנן זיל בתר רובא מנלן דכתיב (שמות כג) אחרי רבים להטות רובא דאיתא קמן כגון ט' חנויות וסנהדרין לא קא מיבעיא לן כי קא מיבעיא לן רובא דליתיה קמן כגון קטן וקטנה מנלן
- - What is the source of the rabbi’s rule: follow the majority?
- - You are asking for the source? Isn’t it written, follow the majority?
- - I was not asking about a majority that is present e.g. nine stores and Sanhedrin. I was asking about a majority that is not in front us, e.g. Male and female minors.
The Gemara sees the case of majority rule in courts as comparable to the one of nine stores and therefore the latter can be deduced from the former. The comparison may be explained that when we accept the court’s majority rule it is because we assume that there is a strong probability that the opinion of the majority is correct and the contrary opinion is non-existent. So too, when there are nine stores selling Kosher meat and one Non-kosher and one finds meat in the street that must have come from one of the stores and is now in doubt from which store it came from, the probability is that it came from the nine and not the single non-kosher one. In either case probability works for the majority – he probably found Kosher food and so too the court majority ruled correctly. That is not so in the case of Bitul; we always have the forbidden mixed with the permissible. How do we deduce from the courts that the forbidden – which is still present – is seen as non-existent? We still have no good explanation how the case of Bitul can be compared to the court case.
Rabbi Chaim Brisker (Chidushei Hagrach LaShas – stencil – Baba Kama 27b) suggests that there is Bitul in the case of the Courts. The Torah requires that a Beit Din be composed of a certain number of people, three for monetary matters, twenty three for capital cases and so on. In a case of a disagreement, when we follow the majority, aren’t we deciding a ruling without the required minimum of Dayanim? The Torah however teaches that if the minimum members are present, even when they are not unanimous, they can still rule and the ruling is binding. That shows that the minority opinion is not seen as non-existent but rather as agreeing with the majority. In other words, we see the minority as being forced to adopt the opinion of the majority and now we have a unanimous ruling by the required minimum Dayanim. It is an ingenious suggestion but works only if we assume that there must be a minimum of, for example, 23 Dayanim deciding the case. We can also alternatively understand that the Torah requires a minimum of Dayanim deliberating a case and if a majority agrees they can then decide and rule according to that majority as long as 23 partook in the deliberations. Reb Chaim’s proofs from various sources, Tosafot in Baba Kama 27b and Sanhedrin 30a are not convincing. (RGN presents strong rebuttals which I will not discuss here).
In our discussion so far we have assumed that the reason for following the majority in the case of the courts and the nine stores is based on probability. This assumption needs to be reassessed.
1. We can demonstrate that the Gemara in Chulin 11a did not see it that way. The Gemara accepts the comparison of the nine store case to the courts but does not agree to compare the case of the male and female minors to it. The latter case is one of Yibum – levirate marriage – with the involvement of a minor. A brother’s wife is considered an Erva –intimate relationships are forbidden with her - even after the brother’s death. If however the couple had no children, there is a positive commandment for the surviving brother to marry the widow. The Mitzvah of Yibum supersedes the Issur Erva because, as the Torah explains, the brother is required to establish the deceased brother’s name – namely give him an heir. In the case that either the surviving brother is a minor or the widow is one, there is a possibility that either one will grow up sterile and thus will be unable to fulfill the intent of the law. We however do not worry about it and say that the majority of children do not grow up sterile and rely on the rule of following the majority. That being a probability why does the Gemara not accept it as similar to the majority rule of the court which we suggested is also based on probability? Why would relying on a probability of something occurring in the future רובא דליתיה קמן be less of a probability? It shows that the Gemara was on a different track and probability was not the reason for this rule and when the Gemara differentiated between a majority that is present and one that is not, some other principle was involved in its thinking. Should one suggest that the Gemara was basing its question on a Gezeirat Hakatuv, namely that we see the Torah uses the case of the courts to set down the rule of Rove and that is a majority that is present that would also negate the comparison to the nine stores. A Gezeirat Hakatuv which supposedly has no rationale should not allow for deductions and extrapolations. The rule would apply only to the case where it is used and nowhere else.
2. In the case of the nine stores, we described it as one finding a piece of meat in the street in a town where there are nine kosher butchers and one non-kosher one. It is only in that case that we follow Rove. In the case where one bought a piece of meat from one of the stores not knowing which store it was, the rule of rove does not apply and the meat is considered non-kosher. The basis of this ruling is a verse in Devarim 19::11
וְכִי-יִהְיֶה אִישׁ, שֹׂנֵא לְרֵעֵהוּ, וְאָרַב לוֹ וְקָם עָלָיו, וְהִכָּהוּ נֶפֶשׁ וָמֵת; וְנָס, אֶל-אַחַת הֶעָרִים הָאֵל.
The subject is the law of the sanctuary cities. The Torah allows for an accidental murderer to escape to one of those cities and remain safe from a vengeful relative of the victim. The Torah defines “accidental” and then adds a negative condition; should the murderer have lain in wait for his victim, he would not be eligible for sanctuary. That seems to be limiting what would be considered intentional murder to only when the murderer was lying in wait. One opinion is that it limits a case of someone throwing a rock into a group of ten people that contained one person who, if killed, the murderer would not get the death penalty. Even though the great majority of the people made the murderer eligible for the death penalty, that one ineligible one in the group saves him from that fate. The rule of Rove does not apply here because when the Rove is stationary we look at each individual as one of two (similar to the odds in dice) and therefore the exempting person is matched to each of the group individually. We now have an even possibility rather that Rove. The same applies to the nine stores in our case. If probability is the underlying basis for majority rule, how does it work here? How does this situation affect the probability of the murderer killing the one that exempts from death penalty rather than one of nine regular people? If again we would see this as a Gezeirat Hakatuv, how then can we extrapolate to the case of the nine stores and make it into a general rule that כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה?
3. The entire premise that the majority of the Dayanim is correct is questionable. A difference of opinion amongst Dayanim is usually subjective. The case that presents itself has many nuances and to decide which of the two petitioners is telling the truth or his perception of what really happened is correct depends on intuition and other non-objective analyses; attitude, demeanor, body language and so on. A majority does not have a better chance to get at the truth than the minority. There are cases too that can be decided either way based on the text and the rules of interpretation. (We find in Hilchot Mamrim 2:1 that a later supreme court may overturn the ruling of an earlier one based on their own interpretation. My addition DG). Clearly there is more than one truth. We must therefore conclude that the majority rule has nothing to do with the probability that they are correct. It is just a practical rule where decisions are required and we follow the majority right or wrong otherwise we would never arrive at a conclusion.
To answer the questions we presented, RGN introduces several what I consider revolutionary ideas and unique approaches of integrating Halacha, Philosophy and Psychology. RGN explains that the generally accepted idea that Gezeirat Hakatuv has no rationale is incorrect. When there are two or more ways to look at something, the Gezeirat Hakatuv, the Torah tells us the path to choose. Without the Torah we would be at a loss how to proceed as each path has its own logic. However, the path chosen by the Gezeirat Hakatuv itself, the choice it made, tells us what the thinking behind that choice is and we can use that rationale for other similar situations.
The idea behind the Gezeirat Hakatuv of following the majority is that when a person is confronted by a mixture, the majority is dominant and is seen as the totality. For example, if a field is green but has some minor patches of yellow, a person that looks at the field refers to it as a green field. A rice dish that has some vegetables mixed into it is referred to as a rice dish notwithstanding the other minority ingredients. This idea applies to all cases whether it is a court or a food mixture. It does not mean that the minority opinion in the case of a court is non-existent but rather the majority opinion that the court ruling follows is representative of this court. We see this in our day to day life too. The current Supreme Court is the Roberts court and its decisions are referred to as that court’s decision although there were dissenting opinions. The same applies in a mixture of permissible and forbidden foods. The forbidden food is there, in fact if more forbidden food falls into the mixture, enough for it to now constitutes a majority, the mixture becomes forbidden again – Chozer Veni’ur (see Rosh above a little further). But while the forbidden food is in the minority, we refer to the whole mixture as permissible. Without the Gezeirat Hakatuv we would consider every mixture as questionable, every court ruling that has dissenters as unresolved, and the rules of Safek would apply – De’oraita lechumra and Derabanan lekula. If the subject matter is a Torah prohibition we would act strictly while if a rabbinic rule leniently. The Gezeirat Hakatuv tells us to choose the side of the majority and act accordingly. We look at all “mixtures” as being uniform, whether it is a court with dissenters or a food mixture.
Now the two cases of the “nine stores” become clearer. When the piece of meat is found in the street, we look at all the town’s butchers from where this meat came from as one entity that is Kosher. The one store that is not kosher does not stand out in that whole. However, when a person doubts into which butcher store he entered to purchase, worrying that he might have bought it in the non-kosher one, we have two choices. We can look at the stores and see them as above or we can argue that when then person entered the store to buy meat, this store was a well-defined location that does not become one with the other store and therefore is not seen as one entity. The fact that he does not remember which store it was leaves the question open and the safek remains. It should therefore be treated as a Safek would. We therefore have the Gezeirat Hakatuv of, וְאָרַב לוֹ וְקָם עָלָיו, to teach us that indeed the second position is the Torah’s choice and it remains a Safek. There is a rationale for this choice and a very important one. A person who knows that there is a non-Kosher butcher amongst the town’s butchers is very much aware of that. This is very much on his mind. When a question develops in which store he purchased, a question mark will always remain in his mind. On the other hand when a piece of meat is found in the street, the whole focus is on this particular piece of meat. There is no awareness that it might be forbidden as most of the meat in town is kosher. Following the majority fits well with the persons perception. RGN explains, and to me this is the most important point, that Mitzvot are there to influence our behavior and our thinking. Human nature and perception therefore play a central role in how Halacha deals with all Mitzvot. There is no intrinsic Issur just as it relates to the self -control of the observant religious person. Permitting one to eat something that in his perception there still is doubt about its permissibility is counter-productive when self-control is the objective. Rav Sheilat in a note comments that RGN repeated this point in many of his shiurim.
Finally, the Gemara in Chulin that differentiates between the cases of the courts and the nine stores and on the other hand the case of Yibum of minors can also be understood with this reasoning. While the courts are seen as one entity and the decision ignores the dissenting minority, that is not so with the case of Yibum. The possibility of a minor becoming sterile is rare but that possibility is not part of a group or entity where the overwhelming majority can swallow it up and thus ignore it. Here we need to turn to probability, a totally different concept. The Gemara therefore looks for a different comparison. אחרי רבים להטות would not cover this case.
I believe that we learned two very important ideas from this discussion of Rove by RGN. The first is that a Gezeirat Hakatuv has rationale and that rationale can be applied to other cases. The second is the idea that, as Mitzvot are for the betterment of humans and not to placate God, as we apply the practical rules of a Mitzvah, we look at how it affects the person who performs the mitzvah. It is not the actual reality that plays a key role but rather the perception of the person affected. These are very Maimonidean concepts! We also learned that we must not separate learning from its applications in real life and take into account the influence it has on the person who is committed to Halacha.
Disclaimer:
I left out a few other references that RGN addresses such as a Mordechai in Chulin who quotes a rabbeinu Yakar and a Tosafot in Baba Kama that suggests that Rabbi Meir who takes into account the minority does so only in cases similar to Yibum of a minor. They add to the theses of RGN and strengthen it but it would be an impossibly long post and possibly distracting from the main point.
Shabbat Shalom.
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