Rambam in MN 1:70 discusses the word Rochev – to ride – when used by the prophets to describe God. He explains that just as a rider controls the beast he is riding upon, so too God is the Mover of the spheres. The idea is that all physical existence is subject to motion. In Aristotelian science, motion underlies all physical existence. In their view, the four basic elements mix in various combinations resulting in all the different components of the world below the sphere of the moon. That mixing is caused by motion which originates in the circular orbit of the outer sphere which in turn was first put into motion by the First Mover at the dawn of existence. As motion has to be induced, God, the First Mover, caused that original spherical motion. When we say that motion was caused by another body, we imagine one body impelling another, by transferring force from one to another. To dispel us from this imagery, the prophets saw God as the rider of the spheres. Just like a rider controls the animal without transferring anything physical, the animal moves of its own volition as ordered by the rider, so too God set the sphere in motion without transferring anything from Himself. Rambam shows how this concept is found in the prophetic writings and both in the Talmud and Midrashim. He shows how the Rabbis in their cryptic way were teaching these metaphysical truths in Breishit Rabah 68:10 (pages 777-778 in the Theodor-Albeck Edition), Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer 18 and the Gemara in Hagigah 12b. (I plan to write a separate post explaining this Rambam). In the middle of the chapter Rambam comments–
“Consider how these excellent and true ideas, comprehended only by the greatest philosophers, are found scattered in the Midrashim. When a student who disavows truth reads them, he will at first sight, deride them as being contrary to the real state of things. The cause of this is because our Sages spoke of these subjects in metaphors: they are too difficult for the common understanding of the people, as has been noted by us several times.” (MN1:70)
In the following chapter, MN 1:71 Rambam addresses why these deep truths are so rare in the Talmud and Midrashim. He explains that the political status of the Jewish people, the influence of foreign conquerors, eradicated all that knowledge which was orally transmitted. The little that remained was scattered in the Talmud and Midrashim in a very esoteric form.
“This was the cause that necessitated the disappearance of these great roots of knowledge from the nation. For you will not find with regard to them anything except slight indications and pointers occurring in the Talmud and the Midrashim. These are as it were, a few grains belonging to the core which are overlaid by many layers of rind, so that people were occupied with these layers of rind and thought that beneath them there was no core whatsoever.” (MN 1:71)
He then continues to explain that the few philosophical writings that we do find amongst the Geonim as well as the Karaites (!) were not based on tradition but rather developed by those people by adapting contemporary non-Jewish philosophy.
Professor Loberbaum in his article reads this Rambam out of its context, focusing on the above quote and arguing that “a few grains belonging to the core which are overlaid by many layers of rind” clearly indicates that the Rabbinic Midrashim were not reliable because of “the disappearance of these great roots of knowledge from the nation.” He concludes that Rambam held that the Talmud and Midrashim were not philosophical/scientific texts and that most Rabbis were not philosophers.
I really do not see that at all in reading the Rambam in context. All he is doing is explaining why these philosophical discussions are rare and why they are so well hidden behind metaphors and allegories. After all he just finished showing us in the preceding chapter how one should read a series of rabbinic Aggadot and Midrashim that complement prophetic writings and see in them deep metaphysical truths. This is clearly the case in view of the comment I quote earlier from MN 1:70, “Consider how these excellent and true ideas, comprehended only by the greatest philosophers, are found scattered in the Midrashim….”
But now YL, in his concluding remarks, makes a faux pas that shocked me. Here is a translation of his words.
“Rambam explained here- so too in chapter 59 – that what is found in the Talmud is at most a few philosophic/scientific statements, that are covered by “many rinds” namely a vast collection of Aggadot that have in them “rubbish and such perverse imaginings”. The rinds in the Talmud are so many that “people were occupied with these layers of rind and thought that beneath them there was no core whatsoever”. (Emphases in the original).”
This statement is a perversion of everything we read so far in the above quotes of Rambam.
“People were occupied with these layers of rind and thought that beneath them there was no core whatsoever”, because the ideas were well hidden and not because there are so many other statements in the Talmud that have only rinds, as implied by YL. But to make matters worse when we turn to chapter 59 from where “rubbish and such perverse imaginings” was lifted and transplanted here, we see that Rambam was talking about Piyuttim and not Aggadot and Midrashim of the Rabbis. In that chapter, Rambam tells us that it is not permissible to develop our own attributes for God especially when we pray. We must limit ourselves to what the Rabbis have taught us based on their readings of the prophetic writings.
“We cannot approve of what those foolish persons do, that are extravagant in praise, fluent and prolix in the prayers they compose, and in the hymns they make in the desire to approach the Creator. They describe God in attributes which would be an offence if applied to a human being, for those persons have no knowledge of these great and important principles, which are not accessible to the ordinary intelligence of man. Treating the Creator as a familiar object, they describe Him and speak of Him in any expressions they think proper; they eloquently continue to praise Him in that manner, and believe that they can thereby influence Him and produce an effect on Him. If they find some phrase suited to their object in the words of the Prophets they are still more inclined to consider that they are free to make use of such texts--which should at least be explained--to employ them in their literal sense, to derive new expressions from them, to form from them numerous variations, and to found whole compositions on them. This license is frequently met with in the compositions of the singers, preachers, and others who imagine themselves to be able to compose a poem. Such authors write things which partly are real heresy, partly contain rubbish and such perverse imaginings, so that they naturally cause those who hear them to laugh, but also to feel grieved at the thought that such things can be uttered in reference to God.” (MN1:59)
Need I say more? Since when are medieval Paytannim the authors of Midrashim and Aggadot? YL shows the weakness of his arguments when he has to resort to obvious distortions that can be verified by simply turning to the source, in order to prove his point.
That being the case, why do I read articles by scholars? Why did I spend a series of posts disagreeing with Professor Loberbaum? The answer is simple. One learns from everybody even when someone is at best misguided, at worse dishonest in his or her reading of the great medieval thinkers. One is forced to go back to the source and reread it with the latest reading in mind. Inevitably, new insights are gleaned and a better understanding is reached. I also learn a lot from good scholarly work. Unfortunately, the pressure to publish and be innovative leads many to stray from the purported quest for the truth. But there are “a few grains belonging to the core” amongst “many layers of rind”, following YL’s way of reading.
Knowledge is the building block of Judaism. Love of God is contingent on what one knows about Him. ועל פי הדעה--על פי האהבה--אם מעט מעט, ואם הרבה הרבה I am planning to post from time to time some of the ideas that I develop as I read and think about issues that catch my attention. Usually they relate to Machshava or Halacha especially how they affect our daily life. I am looking forward to learn from all commenters.
Showing posts with label Yair Loberbaum. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yair Loberbaum. Show all posts
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Monday, October 12, 2009
Did Rambam's Attitude To Aggadah Evolve? - A review of Professor Loberbaum Article (Part 5).
Professor Loberbaum proceeds to try to prove his thesis that Rambam lost respect for Aggadot, as he grew older. Rambam in his introduction to the Moreh describes the metaphors and allegories found in the prophetic texts. He first quotes a Midrash from Shir Hashirim Rabah where the Rabbis describe the processes Shlomo Hamelech used in his metaphors.
“Again, Solomon begins his book of Proverbs with the words, "To understand a proverb and figurative speech, the words of the wise and their dark sayings" (Prov. 1:6); and we read in Midrash, Shir Hashirim Raba, 1:1); "To what were the words of the Torah to be compared before the time of Solomon? To a well, the waters of which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh, yet no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord with cord, and rope with rope, and drew up and drank. So too Solomon went from figure to figure, and from subject to subject, till he obtained the true sense of the Torah." So far go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any intelligent man thinks that "the words of the Torah" mentioned here as requiring the application of figures in order to be understood, can refer to the rules for building Sukkot, for preparing the Lulav, or for the law of the four trustees.”
The Midrash presents Shir Hashirim as a prophetic parable. It is teaching us how to read the parable. It offers different metaphors which suggest that we need to be careful how we read these parables and how we decipher them. The metaphor in this segment of the Midrash describes how at times a systematic approach is required, where every component, the ropes and the cords are attached and by slowly following the clues in proper order, we can grasp the intended goal – the difficult and hidden idea. Rambam quotes another metaphor the rabbis use to describe how one reads a prophetic parable.
“What is really meant is the apprehension of profound and difficult subjects, concerning which our Sages said, "If a man loses in his house a sela, or a pearl, he can find it by lighting a taper worth only one issar. Thus the parables in themselves are of no great value, but through them the words of the holy Law are rendered intelligible." These likewise are the words of our Sages; consider well their statement that the internal meaning of the words of the Torah is a pearl whereas the external meaning of all parables is of no value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning included in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark room, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl is in the room, but the man can neither see it nor know where it lies. It is just as if the pearl were no longer in his possession, for, as has been stated, it affords him no benefits whatsoever until he kindles a light. The same is the case with the comprehension of that which the simile represents.”
Some prophetic parables contain filler which are unimportant and one should not try to explain every detail of it. The metaphor describes the relative value of the light and the pearl where one is a tool to find the other, the important item. Rambam adds a little to the Midrash by introducing the furniture that fills the room that is a co-conspirator with the darkness in hiding the valuable pearl. In other words although the candle lights up the room, one still has to clean away the valueless furniture before finding the pearl.
Rambam then describes a type of metaphor also found in the prophetic writings where there are dual meanings where both are important, though one may be of greater importance than the other may. In other words, once the reader has grasped what the parable is trying to teach, he may encounter a double meaning where the external teaches important matters but is only like silver in comparison to the gold found in the deeper meaning.
“The wise king said, "A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in vessels of silver" (Prov. 25:11). Hear the explanation of what he said: The word maskiyoth, the Hebrew equivalent for "vessels," denotes "filigree network"--i.e., things in which there are very small apertures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths. They are called in Hebrew maskiyyoth (literally "transpicuous," from the verb sakah, "he saw," a root which occurs also in the Targum of Onkelos, Gen. 26:8), because the eye penetrates through them. Thus, Solomon meant to say, "Just as apples of gold in silver filigree with small apertures, so is a word fitly spoken."
See how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are described in this figure! It shows that in every word which has a double sense, a literal one and a figurative one, the plain meaning must be as valuable as silver, and the hidden meaning still more precious: so that the figurative meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold to silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of the phrase shall give to those who consider it some notion of that which the figure represents. Just as a golden apple overlaid with a network of silver, when seen at a distance, or looked at superficially, is mistaken for a silver apple, but when a keen-sighted person looks at the object well, he will find what is within, and see that the apple is gold. The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets. Taken literally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for many purposes, among others, for the amelioration of the condition of society; e.g., the Proverbs (of Solomon), and similar sayings in their literal sense. Their hidden meaning, however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the recognition of real truth.”
Clearly, Rambam is not talking here about the parable itself but about what was deciphered by either the reader or the prophet in describing his vision. He tells us that one must not stop at the first teaching one grasps because many times there are dual meanings, where a deeper ontological or metaphysical idea is also present.
For some reason YL sees these descriptions of prophetic writings as a criticism of how the Aggadot are different. He contrasts the “good simile” in the last example with the ones before where there is some fluff in the parable. He is confusing the description of a parable with a description of the result one gets once the parable is deciphered. Furthermore, YL somehow reads this whole discussion to refer to Aggadot, though a careful read of the quotations above clearly show they are ALL describing PROPHETIC parables. Rambam is at first quoting Midrashic metaphors that describe the prophetic parables and then quotes Shlomo Hamelech who describes the results of the deciphered parables as having more than one meaning – silver and gold. I reread the section several times and for the life of me cannot see what YL sees there. I leave it to the reader to decide.
z2There is one more purported “proof” that I will discuss before summarizing and opining.
“Again, Solomon begins his book of Proverbs with the words, "To understand a proverb and figurative speech, the words of the wise and their dark sayings" (Prov. 1:6); and we read in Midrash, Shir Hashirim Raba, 1:1); "To what were the words of the Torah to be compared before the time of Solomon? To a well, the waters of which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh, yet no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord with cord, and rope with rope, and drew up and drank. So too Solomon went from figure to figure, and from subject to subject, till he obtained the true sense of the Torah." So far go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any intelligent man thinks that "the words of the Torah" mentioned here as requiring the application of figures in order to be understood, can refer to the rules for building Sukkot, for preparing the Lulav, or for the law of the four trustees.”
The Midrash presents Shir Hashirim as a prophetic parable. It is teaching us how to read the parable. It offers different metaphors which suggest that we need to be careful how we read these parables and how we decipher them. The metaphor in this segment of the Midrash describes how at times a systematic approach is required, where every component, the ropes and the cords are attached and by slowly following the clues in proper order, we can grasp the intended goal – the difficult and hidden idea. Rambam quotes another metaphor the rabbis use to describe how one reads a prophetic parable.
“What is really meant is the apprehension of profound and difficult subjects, concerning which our Sages said, "If a man loses in his house a sela, or a pearl, he can find it by lighting a taper worth only one issar. Thus the parables in themselves are of no great value, but through them the words of the holy Law are rendered intelligible." These likewise are the words of our Sages; consider well their statement that the internal meaning of the words of the Torah is a pearl whereas the external meaning of all parables is of no value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning included in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark room, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl is in the room, but the man can neither see it nor know where it lies. It is just as if the pearl were no longer in his possession, for, as has been stated, it affords him no benefits whatsoever until he kindles a light. The same is the case with the comprehension of that which the simile represents.”
Some prophetic parables contain filler which are unimportant and one should not try to explain every detail of it. The metaphor describes the relative value of the light and the pearl where one is a tool to find the other, the important item. Rambam adds a little to the Midrash by introducing the furniture that fills the room that is a co-conspirator with the darkness in hiding the valuable pearl. In other words although the candle lights up the room, one still has to clean away the valueless furniture before finding the pearl.
Rambam then describes a type of metaphor also found in the prophetic writings where there are dual meanings where both are important, though one may be of greater importance than the other may. In other words, once the reader has grasped what the parable is trying to teach, he may encounter a double meaning where the external teaches important matters but is only like silver in comparison to the gold found in the deeper meaning.
“The wise king said, "A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in vessels of silver" (Prov. 25:11). Hear the explanation of what he said: The word maskiyoth, the Hebrew equivalent for "vessels," denotes "filigree network"--i.e., things in which there are very small apertures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths. They are called in Hebrew maskiyyoth (literally "transpicuous," from the verb sakah, "he saw," a root which occurs also in the Targum of Onkelos, Gen. 26:8), because the eye penetrates through them. Thus, Solomon meant to say, "Just as apples of gold in silver filigree with small apertures, so is a word fitly spoken."
See how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are described in this figure! It shows that in every word which has a double sense, a literal one and a figurative one, the plain meaning must be as valuable as silver, and the hidden meaning still more precious: so that the figurative meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold to silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of the phrase shall give to those who consider it some notion of that which the figure represents. Just as a golden apple overlaid with a network of silver, when seen at a distance, or looked at superficially, is mistaken for a silver apple, but when a keen-sighted person looks at the object well, he will find what is within, and see that the apple is gold. The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets. Taken literally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for many purposes, among others, for the amelioration of the condition of society; e.g., the Proverbs (of Solomon), and similar sayings in their literal sense. Their hidden meaning, however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the recognition of real truth.”
Clearly, Rambam is not talking here about the parable itself but about what was deciphered by either the reader or the prophet in describing his vision. He tells us that one must not stop at the first teaching one grasps because many times there are dual meanings, where a deeper ontological or metaphysical idea is also present.
For some reason YL sees these descriptions of prophetic writings as a criticism of how the Aggadot are different. He contrasts the “good simile” in the last example with the ones before where there is some fluff in the parable. He is confusing the description of a parable with a description of the result one gets once the parable is deciphered. Furthermore, YL somehow reads this whole discussion to refer to Aggadot, though a careful read of the quotations above clearly show they are ALL describing PROPHETIC parables. Rambam is at first quoting Midrashic metaphors that describe the prophetic parables and then quotes Shlomo Hamelech who describes the results of the deciphered parables as having more than one meaning – silver and gold. I reread the section several times and for the life of me cannot see what YL sees there. I leave it to the reader to decide.
z2There is one more purported “proof” that I will discuss before summarizing and opining.
Thursday, October 01, 2009
Did Rambam's Attitude To Aggadah Evolve? - A review of Professor Loberbaum Article (Part 4).
In apparent digression, Rambam in MN 3:43, in the midst of discussing reasons for the different festivals and specifically the reason for taking the Lulav and Etrog on Sukkot, discusses a certain type of Midrashic exegesis. Professor Loberbaum uses it to further develop his theory about Rambam’s supposed change of opinion regarding Rabbinical Aggadot.
“As regards the four species [the branches of the palm tree, the citron, the myrtle, and the willows of the brook] our Sages gave a reason for their use by way of Aggadic interpretation, the method of which is well known to those who are acquainted with the style of our Sages. They use the text of the Bible only as a kind of poetical language [for their own ideas], and do not intend thereby to give an interpretation of the text. As to the value of these Midrashic interpretations, we meet with two different opinions. For some think that, the Midrash contains the real explanation of the text, whilst others, finding that it cannot be reconciled with the words quoted, reject and ridicule it. The former, struggle and fight to prove and to confirm such interpretations according to their opinion, and to keep them as the real meaning of the text; they consider them in the same light as traditional laws. Neither of the two classes understood it, that our Sages employ biblical texts merely as poetical expressions, the meaning of which is clear to every reasonable reader. This style was general in ancient days; all adopted it in the same way as poets [adopt a certain style]. Our Sages say, in reference to the words, "and a paddle (yated) you shall have upon your weapon" [azeneka, Deut. xxiii. 14]: Do not read azeneka, "thy weapon," but ozneka, "thy ear." You are thus told, that if you hear a person uttering something disgraceful, put your fingers into your ears. Now, I wonder whether those ignorant persons [who take the Midrashic interpretations literally] believe that the author of this saying gave it as the true interpretation of the text quoted, and as the meaning of this precept: that in truth yated, "the paddle," is used for "the finger, "and azeneka denotes "thy ear." I cannot think that any person whose intellect is sound can admit this. The author employed the text as a beautiful poetical phrase, in teaching an excellent moral lesson, namely this: It is as bad to listen to bad language, as it is to use it. This lesson is poetically connected with the above text. In the same sense you must understand the phrase, "Do not read so, but so," wherever it occurs in the Midrash.”
Rambam is referring to a series of Derashot recorded in Vaykra Rabah 30:8-16 about the reason for taking the four kinds – Arbe’a Minim. The first derasha explains how Etrog is connected with the words used to describe it in the Torah, Pri Etz Hadar, and the same for the remaining three. Thereafter, the Midrash discusses possible symbolism in the Mitzvot, such that the four Minim represent different aspects of God, the three patriarchs and Yosef, the four matriarchs and so on. All the Midrashim use the verse as an exegetical device for their ideas. All these references are far from Peshuto Shel Mikrah, the plain meaning of the text. Rambam explains that these types of Midrashic texts are recordings of sermons or sermon types of Aggadot that use a poetic type of presentation. The Rabbis wanted to teach how one should look at Mitzvot and use them for connecting with the transcendental, get in touch with Judaism’s basic tenets and in general teach Hashkafic and ethical concepts, using the text as a tool to impress or as a mnemonic device. The rabbis are not explaining the text but use it as a tool to make their point, which may have nothing to do with the text. As an extreme example, much more distanced from the text than the ones in Vaykra Rabah, Rambam quotes the one about stuffing your fingers in your ears when confronted with prohibited talk. Clearly, the verse is not talking about it and the Rabbis just used it as a device to make a totally unrelated point. Rambam uses this opportunity to describe and explain a certain common type of Midrashic text amongst many other types of such texts.
YL however wants to take this a step further. In the Pirush Hamishna in the introduction to Chelek Rambam also presented three opinions about Derashot: Those who insist on literalness, those who denigrate and the third group, the correct ones, those who see in them great depth and philosophical teachings. If we set them parallel with the three groups Rambam enumerates here, the third correct one is parallel to the ones who understand the exegetical method of teaching unrelated issues using the verse. YL contrasts Rambam’s description of the correct approach in Chelek as philosophical and of great depth while here he describes it as poetical and not the real meaning of the text. In other words in Chelek the Rabbis teach a deep and true concept as opposed to here, where they distort the true meaning of the text. Furthermore, Rambam describes them as “derashot”, public sermons, that are directed to the masses and not of great depth. He therefore claims that again we see a change of heart about Aggadah that is consistent with the supposed change in the introduction to MN we discussed in the previous post. YL does note that the presentation here is milder than the one in the introduction. There, according to YL’s understanding, Rambam was quasi insulting to the Rabbis while here he seems to praise their “poetical talent”. He therefore discovers a “Halachik” impact in these Derashot, which are the reason Rambam is more careful. He does not want to weaken our regard to Halacha! He is also trying to protect Halachik exegesis which when one would insist that it is the meaning of the text, would lose its legitimacy.
If I am correct, and I am convinced I am, that YL misread Rambam in the introduction to MN, as I have shown in the preceding post, this whole argument has no leg to stand on. In addition, my read of the Rambam above is unquestionably correct. Rambam, typical and true to form, sees the complexity of the Derashot. Aggadah is a term that covers many different non-Halachik writings of the rabbis. Some have deep philosophic import and teach very complex issues from observations about our universe and environment to the ontological and metaphysical. They however also contain many ethical and moral teachings; these probably make up the great majority of the Aggadic texts. Some of these were indeed public sermons and used different types of devices to impress upon the listeners. To impress and make sure the teaching is absorbed and remembered they used the text in a non-literal way. To insist that Rambam is monochromatic and his comments are generalized to all Aggadot is disingenuous. I believe that Professor Loberbaum’s reading of this Rambam is faulty and does not prove his point.
However, YL has still more proofs and I want to address them. At the end of this series, I plan a post to explain why I decided to address this article and a general comment on the importance of academic work on Rambam.
“As regards the four species [the branches of the palm tree, the citron, the myrtle, and the willows of the brook] our Sages gave a reason for their use by way of Aggadic interpretation, the method of which is well known to those who are acquainted with the style of our Sages. They use the text of the Bible only as a kind of poetical language [for their own ideas], and do not intend thereby to give an interpretation of the text. As to the value of these Midrashic interpretations, we meet with two different opinions. For some think that, the Midrash contains the real explanation of the text, whilst others, finding that it cannot be reconciled with the words quoted, reject and ridicule it. The former, struggle and fight to prove and to confirm such interpretations according to their opinion, and to keep them as the real meaning of the text; they consider them in the same light as traditional laws. Neither of the two classes understood it, that our Sages employ biblical texts merely as poetical expressions, the meaning of which is clear to every reasonable reader. This style was general in ancient days; all adopted it in the same way as poets [adopt a certain style]. Our Sages say, in reference to the words, "and a paddle (yated) you shall have upon your weapon" [azeneka, Deut. xxiii. 14]: Do not read azeneka, "thy weapon," but ozneka, "thy ear." You are thus told, that if you hear a person uttering something disgraceful, put your fingers into your ears. Now, I wonder whether those ignorant persons [who take the Midrashic interpretations literally] believe that the author of this saying gave it as the true interpretation of the text quoted, and as the meaning of this precept: that in truth yated, "the paddle," is used for "the finger, "and azeneka denotes "thy ear." I cannot think that any person whose intellect is sound can admit this. The author employed the text as a beautiful poetical phrase, in teaching an excellent moral lesson, namely this: It is as bad to listen to bad language, as it is to use it. This lesson is poetically connected with the above text. In the same sense you must understand the phrase, "Do not read so, but so," wherever it occurs in the Midrash.”
Rambam is referring to a series of Derashot recorded in Vaykra Rabah 30:8-16 about the reason for taking the four kinds – Arbe’a Minim. The first derasha explains how Etrog is connected with the words used to describe it in the Torah, Pri Etz Hadar, and the same for the remaining three. Thereafter, the Midrash discusses possible symbolism in the Mitzvot, such that the four Minim represent different aspects of God, the three patriarchs and Yosef, the four matriarchs and so on. All the Midrashim use the verse as an exegetical device for their ideas. All these references are far from Peshuto Shel Mikrah, the plain meaning of the text. Rambam explains that these types of Midrashic texts are recordings of sermons or sermon types of Aggadot that use a poetic type of presentation. The Rabbis wanted to teach how one should look at Mitzvot and use them for connecting with the transcendental, get in touch with Judaism’s basic tenets and in general teach Hashkafic and ethical concepts, using the text as a tool to impress or as a mnemonic device. The rabbis are not explaining the text but use it as a tool to make their point, which may have nothing to do with the text. As an extreme example, much more distanced from the text than the ones in Vaykra Rabah, Rambam quotes the one about stuffing your fingers in your ears when confronted with prohibited talk. Clearly, the verse is not talking about it and the Rabbis just used it as a device to make a totally unrelated point. Rambam uses this opportunity to describe and explain a certain common type of Midrashic text amongst many other types of such texts.
YL however wants to take this a step further. In the Pirush Hamishna in the introduction to Chelek Rambam also presented three opinions about Derashot: Those who insist on literalness, those who denigrate and the third group, the correct ones, those who see in them great depth and philosophical teachings. If we set them parallel with the three groups Rambam enumerates here, the third correct one is parallel to the ones who understand the exegetical method of teaching unrelated issues using the verse. YL contrasts Rambam’s description of the correct approach in Chelek as philosophical and of great depth while here he describes it as poetical and not the real meaning of the text. In other words in Chelek the Rabbis teach a deep and true concept as opposed to here, where they distort the true meaning of the text. Furthermore, Rambam describes them as “derashot”, public sermons, that are directed to the masses and not of great depth. He therefore claims that again we see a change of heart about Aggadah that is consistent with the supposed change in the introduction to MN we discussed in the previous post. YL does note that the presentation here is milder than the one in the introduction. There, according to YL’s understanding, Rambam was quasi insulting to the Rabbis while here he seems to praise their “poetical talent”. He therefore discovers a “Halachik” impact in these Derashot, which are the reason Rambam is more careful. He does not want to weaken our regard to Halacha! He is also trying to protect Halachik exegesis which when one would insist that it is the meaning of the text, would lose its legitimacy.
If I am correct, and I am convinced I am, that YL misread Rambam in the introduction to MN, as I have shown in the preceding post, this whole argument has no leg to stand on. In addition, my read of the Rambam above is unquestionably correct. Rambam, typical and true to form, sees the complexity of the Derashot. Aggadah is a term that covers many different non-Halachik writings of the rabbis. Some have deep philosophic import and teach very complex issues from observations about our universe and environment to the ontological and metaphysical. They however also contain many ethical and moral teachings; these probably make up the great majority of the Aggadic texts. Some of these were indeed public sermons and used different types of devices to impress upon the listeners. To impress and make sure the teaching is absorbed and remembered they used the text in a non-literal way. To insist that Rambam is monochromatic and his comments are generalized to all Aggadot is disingenuous. I believe that Professor Loberbaum’s reading of this Rambam is faulty and does not prove his point.
However, YL has still more proofs and I want to address them. At the end of this series, I plan a post to explain why I decided to address this article and a general comment on the importance of academic work on Rambam.
Friday, September 25, 2009
Did Rambam's Attitude To Aggadah Evolve? - A review of Professor Loberbaum Article (Part 3).
Professor Yair Loberbaum in his article turns to the Moreh in his attempt to show that Rambam’s attitude towards Aggadah changed drastically in his later years (Rambam wrote it in his fifties).
In his introduction, Rambam enumerates seven possible reasons why we sometime find contradictions in things we read and then proceeds to bring examples that fit each of these categories. The contradictions we find in Mishna and Braitot usually belong to the first category where two opinions are brought down without clarifying that they belong to two different people. The contradictions in Talmud fall either under the same category or under the second one where an author changes his mind and both opinions are recorded. The contradictions in the writings of the prophets fall under either the third where there is a mixture of metaphor and plain talk or under the fourth where certain conditions are omitted. If one does not discover the omission, one gets the impression that there is a contradiction when there really is not. (I plan to discuss this last issue at length on another occasion so forgive my skimming it superficially here (as per the fifth reason)).
“As for the divergences occurring in the books of the philosophers, or rather those who know the truth, they are due to the fifth cause.”
The fifth cause for contradictions is pedagogical. Sometimes an easier subject has to be taught before the more difficult one, but cannot be comprehended without having a superficial understanding of the more difficult subject. The difficult subject is presented in a way that can be understood by the unsophisticated even if it is not exactly accurate. As the student progresses he will return and acquire a deeper and more accurate understanding of the matter.
“On the other hand, the contradictions occurring in most of the books of authors and
commentators other than those we have mentioned are due to the sixth cause. Likewise, in the Midrashim and the Haggadah there is to be found great contradictions due to this cause. That is why the sages have said: No questions should be asked about difficulties in the Haggadah. There are also to be found therein contradictions due to the seventh cause.”
Professor Loberbaum reads the sixth cause as negative. It describes authors that write about deep matters and err because they have not figured out all the ramifications that result from their position thus taking a contradictory stand on a related matter. While philosopher’s contradictions are pedagogical, Aggadah is contradictory because it is wrong. Therefore, they should be disregarded – “No questions should be asked about difficulties in the Haggadah”. Contrast this with Rambam’s position in Pirush Hamishna that Aggadot are deep metaphors, clearly there is a change of heart from the young to the old Rambam.
As the discussion here focuses on the sixth cause, I quote it in full.
“The Sixth cause: The contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever.”
Rambam explains that even amongst the greatest thinkers there is the possibility of not taking an idea to its ultimate conclusion. When that occurs, a contradiction may exist between two statements where one only becomes aware of it when that ultimate conclusion is reached. When the ultimate conclusion is easy to arrive at and obvious, the contradiction can only be because the writer has missed it through negligence or forgotten his earlier position. Such authors are not considered in this analysis. However, when the conclusion is not apparent and needs much thought and processing, such errors may occur amongst the best. It is however noteworthy that Rambam does not assume such a possibility in Halachik matters in Mishna and Talmud nor in the books of the prophets. He does however do so with “commentators”, which apparently include those who comment on Halachik subjects. Revelation cannot be suspected of not thinking through to the end, nor can a work composed by the many such as Mishna and Talmud be suspected of doing so. In metaphysics on the other hand, which is the subject of Aggadah, even the greatest may fall prey to such an error. Therefore, when we encounter such a contradiction we have to accept that is due to a contradiction that was not apparent to the author and questions stop there, thus “No questions should be asked about difficulties in the Haggadah”. There is no indication that they should be disregarded as YL reads it.
If we read it this way, it would agree with Rambam’s earlier position that there is great depth in Aggadah and should be taken very seriously. I did not see Rambam claim that there are no errors and the Rabbis were always right. In fact, Rambam many times questions the correctness of Tannaim and Amoraim when it comes to metaphysical and philosophical issues. Even the great Rabbi Eliezer ben Hurkanos, Rabbi Eliezer Hagadol, does not escape his critique. My reading finds support if the version Rav Kafieh mentions in note 28 is correct. “Divergences that are to be found in this treatise are due to the fifth, (sixth – according to the R. Kafieh versions) and the seventh.” I do not think Rambam would assign the sixth cause to himself if it had a negative connotation.
YL dwells on Rambam statement, “Likewise, in the Midrashim and the Haggadah there is to be found great contradictions due to this cause”. He tries to argue that “great contradictions” fall under the category of, “If, however, the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever”. He equates “Great contradictions” with “the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered”. I believe he is stretching here to make a point. “Great” in this context is more a matter of the subject, where a contradiction in an important matter is seen as great, not because it is obvious.
I do not think this proof is very convincing. However, there is more to come and I will look at those proofs too. I also plan to tackle these contradictions in a series of posts, the different way of reading prophetic writings and Midrash and Aggadah. As we all know, when one learns Rambam one has to be very careful with the words he uses, context, tone and the order in which things are presented.
Shabbat Shalom.
In his introduction, Rambam enumerates seven possible reasons why we sometime find contradictions in things we read and then proceeds to bring examples that fit each of these categories. The contradictions we find in Mishna and Braitot usually belong to the first category where two opinions are brought down without clarifying that they belong to two different people. The contradictions in Talmud fall either under the same category or under the second one where an author changes his mind and both opinions are recorded. The contradictions in the writings of the prophets fall under either the third where there is a mixture of metaphor and plain talk or under the fourth where certain conditions are omitted. If one does not discover the omission, one gets the impression that there is a contradiction when there really is not. (I plan to discuss this last issue at length on another occasion so forgive my skimming it superficially here (as per the fifth reason)).
“As for the divergences occurring in the books of the philosophers, or rather those who know the truth, they are due to the fifth cause.”
The fifth cause for contradictions is pedagogical. Sometimes an easier subject has to be taught before the more difficult one, but cannot be comprehended without having a superficial understanding of the more difficult subject. The difficult subject is presented in a way that can be understood by the unsophisticated even if it is not exactly accurate. As the student progresses he will return and acquire a deeper and more accurate understanding of the matter.
“On the other hand, the contradictions occurring in most of the books of authors and
commentators other than those we have mentioned are due to the sixth cause. Likewise, in the Midrashim and the Haggadah there is to be found great contradictions due to this cause. That is why the sages have said: No questions should be asked about difficulties in the Haggadah. There are also to be found therein contradictions due to the seventh cause.”
Professor Loberbaum reads the sixth cause as negative. It describes authors that write about deep matters and err because they have not figured out all the ramifications that result from their position thus taking a contradictory stand on a related matter. While philosopher’s contradictions are pedagogical, Aggadah is contradictory because it is wrong. Therefore, they should be disregarded – “No questions should be asked about difficulties in the Haggadah”. Contrast this with Rambam’s position in Pirush Hamishna that Aggadot are deep metaphors, clearly there is a change of heart from the young to the old Rambam.
As the discussion here focuses on the sixth cause, I quote it in full.
“The Sixth cause: The contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever.”
Rambam explains that even amongst the greatest thinkers there is the possibility of not taking an idea to its ultimate conclusion. When that occurs, a contradiction may exist between two statements where one only becomes aware of it when that ultimate conclusion is reached. When the ultimate conclusion is easy to arrive at and obvious, the contradiction can only be because the writer has missed it through negligence or forgotten his earlier position. Such authors are not considered in this analysis. However, when the conclusion is not apparent and needs much thought and processing, such errors may occur amongst the best. It is however noteworthy that Rambam does not assume such a possibility in Halachik matters in Mishna and Talmud nor in the books of the prophets. He does however do so with “commentators”, which apparently include those who comment on Halachik subjects. Revelation cannot be suspected of not thinking through to the end, nor can a work composed by the many such as Mishna and Talmud be suspected of doing so. In metaphysics on the other hand, which is the subject of Aggadah, even the greatest may fall prey to such an error. Therefore, when we encounter such a contradiction we have to accept that is due to a contradiction that was not apparent to the author and questions stop there, thus “No questions should be asked about difficulties in the Haggadah”. There is no indication that they should be disregarded as YL reads it.
If we read it this way, it would agree with Rambam’s earlier position that there is great depth in Aggadah and should be taken very seriously. I did not see Rambam claim that there are no errors and the Rabbis were always right. In fact, Rambam many times questions the correctness of Tannaim and Amoraim when it comes to metaphysical and philosophical issues. Even the great Rabbi Eliezer ben Hurkanos, Rabbi Eliezer Hagadol, does not escape his critique. My reading finds support if the version Rav Kafieh mentions in note 28 is correct. “Divergences that are to be found in this treatise are due to the fifth, (sixth – according to the R. Kafieh versions) and the seventh.” I do not think Rambam would assign the sixth cause to himself if it had a negative connotation.
YL dwells on Rambam statement, “Likewise, in the Midrashim and the Haggadah there is to be found great contradictions due to this cause”. He tries to argue that “great contradictions” fall under the category of, “If, however, the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever”. He equates “Great contradictions” with “the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered”. I believe he is stretching here to make a point. “Great” in this context is more a matter of the subject, where a contradiction in an important matter is seen as great, not because it is obvious.
I do not think this proof is very convincing. However, there is more to come and I will look at those proofs too. I also plan to tackle these contradictions in a series of posts, the different way of reading prophetic writings and Midrash and Aggadah. As we all know, when one learns Rambam one has to be very careful with the words he uses, context, tone and the order in which things are presented.
Shabbat Shalom.
Monday, September 21, 2009
Did Rambam's Attitude To Aggadah Evolve? - A review of Professor Loberbaum Article (Part 2).
Professor Yair Loberbaum (YL) proceeds to make his case for his thesis on Rambam’s sharp change in attitude towards Aggadah in his later years. He quotes two responsa written is his later years that seem to suggest that Rambam felt Aggadah was not to be relied upon as opposed to his earlier statement in Pirush Hamishna that it contained great depth. The first is amongst answers to several questions posed to him by the Dayan Rav Pinchas of Alexandria (Blau edition #458 (i) ). The second is a well-known Teshuvah to R. Sa’adyah ben Pinchas, a disciple, regarding the Sefer Shiur Komah about which he clearly changed his mind drastically as he grew older (I quoted and discussed this issue here ). YL contrasts these two divergent positions, with the opinion of the Geonim who dismiss Aggadah as unreliable. He tries to show that in his youth, Rambam disagreed with the Geonim and as he aged, he eventually accepted their take going even further then them as seen from his vehement rejection of Shiur Komah. I will not bother repeating the whole presentation. I did not find it very convincing. Shiur Komah is an esoteric work and though traditionally it is attributed to Rabbi Ishmael, the great Tanah, Rambam believes it to be misattributed and was composed by Greek preachers (ii) . That is far from proving that he felt that one could ignore genuine Tannaitic works. The other responsa, which I quote verbatim in footnote 1 above, is ambiguous and does not necessarily disagree with the possibility of Aggadah containing deep truths. However, as the Aggadot need deciphering, each thinker has a tendency to come to his own interpretations. How then can one ask from them or use them as proofs for a specific position? An alternate interpretation will yield a different understanding. It is in fact consistent with how Ma’aseh Merkavah is supposed to be taught, Mosserim lo Rashei Perakim and the excelling student comes to his own conclusions (iii) .
YL also brings additional support from a comment in Iggeret Techyat Hametim. That is even less convincing than the first two. I am not sure why he resorted to these three “proofs” as they do little to help his thesis.
In the next post, I will discuss the proofs YL brings from the Moreh itself. Some are quite convincing, at least at first blush. We will see if they stand up to scrutiny.
Gmar Chatima Tova to all my friends and readers.
Footnotes.
(i)
שו"ת הרמב"ם סימן תנח
ולעניין יוצא תיבה +הכוונה אולי למאמרו של ר' יוחנן בסנהדרין ק"ח ב' למשפחותיהם יצאו מן התבה אמר ר' יוחנן למשפחותם ולא הם, ועי' הספרות שהביא לוצקי שם /התקופה ל - ל"א/ עמ' תש"ב+ כל אותן הדברים דברי הגדה +על יחסו של רבינו לאגדה עי' לוצקי שם /התקופה ל - ל"א/ עמ' תרצ"ט ואילך+ ואין מקשין בהגדה +עי' על מאמר זה לוצקי שם /התקופה ל - ל"א/ הע' קכ"ד+ וכי דברי קבלה הן או מילי דסברא אלא כל אחד ואחד מעיין [בפירושן] כפי מה שיראה לו בו +השווה דברי רה"ג באוצר הגאונים חגיגה עמ' נ"ט+ ואין בזה לא דברי קבלה ולא אסור ולא מותר ולא דין מן הדינין ולפיכך אין מקשין [בהן] ושמא תאמר לי כמו שיאמרו רבים וכי דברים שבתלמוד אתה קורא הגדה כן כל אלו הדברים וכיוצא בהן הגדה הן בעניינם בין שהיו כתובין בתלמוד +השווה אוצר הגאונים שם /חגיגה/ עמ' ס', והשווה גם לוצקי שם /התקופה ל - ל"א/ סוף הע' קכ"ז+ בין שהיו כתובין בספרי דרשות +הם כנראה המדרשים המיוסדים על פסוקי המקרא ומסודרים לפי סדר התנ"ך+ בין שהיו כתובין בספרי הגדה +הם כנראה הקובצים הכוללים אגדות בלי סדר מיוחד.+ (Blau’s footnotes are inserted between two addition signs in the text above).
(ii)
I am not sure who these Darshanim were, possibly composers of Midrashic texts who attributed to great people their own ideas. A similar claim was levied against the Zohar centuries later.
(iii)
ולא במרכבה ביחיד, אלא אם כן היה חכם ומבין מדעתו and תני רבי חייא אבל מוסרין לו ראשי פרקים Hagigah 13a.
YL also brings additional support from a comment in Iggeret Techyat Hametim. That is even less convincing than the first two. I am not sure why he resorted to these three “proofs” as they do little to help his thesis.
In the next post, I will discuss the proofs YL brings from the Moreh itself. Some are quite convincing, at least at first blush. We will see if they stand up to scrutiny.
Gmar Chatima Tova to all my friends and readers.
Footnotes.
(i)
שו"ת הרמב"ם סימן תנח
ולעניין יוצא תיבה +הכוונה אולי למאמרו של ר' יוחנן בסנהדרין ק"ח ב' למשפחותיהם יצאו מן התבה אמר ר' יוחנן למשפחותם ולא הם, ועי' הספרות שהביא לוצקי שם /התקופה ל - ל"א/ עמ' תש"ב+ כל אותן הדברים דברי הגדה +על יחסו של רבינו לאגדה עי' לוצקי שם /התקופה ל - ל"א/ עמ' תרצ"ט ואילך+ ואין מקשין בהגדה +עי' על מאמר זה לוצקי שם /התקופה ל - ל"א/ הע' קכ"ד+ וכי דברי קבלה הן או מילי דסברא אלא כל אחד ואחד מעיין [בפירושן] כפי מה שיראה לו בו +השווה דברי רה"ג באוצר הגאונים חגיגה עמ' נ"ט+ ואין בזה לא דברי קבלה ולא אסור ולא מותר ולא דין מן הדינין ולפיכך אין מקשין [בהן] ושמא תאמר לי כמו שיאמרו רבים וכי דברים שבתלמוד אתה קורא הגדה כן כל אלו הדברים וכיוצא בהן הגדה הן בעניינם בין שהיו כתובין בתלמוד +השווה אוצר הגאונים שם /חגיגה/ עמ' ס', והשווה גם לוצקי שם /התקופה ל - ל"א/ סוף הע' קכ"ז+ בין שהיו כתובין בספרי דרשות +הם כנראה המדרשים המיוסדים על פסוקי המקרא ומסודרים לפי סדר התנ"ך+ בין שהיו כתובין בספרי הגדה +הם כנראה הקובצים הכוללים אגדות בלי סדר מיוחד.+ (Blau’s footnotes are inserted between two addition signs in the text above).
(ii)
I am not sure who these Darshanim were, possibly composers of Midrashic texts who attributed to great people their own ideas. A similar claim was levied against the Zohar centuries later.
(iii)
ולא במרכבה ביחיד, אלא אם כן היה חכם ומבין מדעתו and תני רבי חייא אבל מוסרין לו ראשי פרקים Hagigah 13a.
Sunday, September 13, 2009
Did Rambam's Attitude To Aggadah Evolve? - A review of Professor Loberbaum Article (Part 1).
I just finished reading a very intriguing article by Professor Yair Loberbaum (YL) in Tarbiz volume 78 #1 October-December 2008. It deals with Rambam’s attitude towards Aggadah and tries to show how his thinking evolved over time. I will try to highlight in upcoming posts YL proofs and see if they stand up to scrutiny.
In the introduction to the Moreh, Rambam writes,
“In our commentary on the Mishna we stated our intention to explain difficult problems in the Book on Prophecy and in the Book of Harmony (Commentary according to Pines). In the latter we intended to examine all the passages in the Midrash which, if taken literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and common sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively.”
Rambam was planning two separate treatises, one dealing with the books of the Prophets and a separate one dealing with the rabbinical exegesis. In fact, in his introduction to Perek Chelek as part of his discussion of the seventh Ikar, he writes:
פירוש המשנה לרמב"ם מסכת סנהדרין פרק י
ולכן אניחנו למקומו או בספר ביאורי הדרשות שהבטחתי בו, או בספר הנבואה שהתחלתי לחברו, או בספר שאחבר בפירוש אלו היסודות
After telling us that it would take a lot to explain prophecy and how Moshe’s prophecy differs, Rambam writes,
“And I will leave it to write about it in its proper place, either in the treatise on the derashot (exegesis) which I promised, or the book on the prophets which I have already begun to write, or in a treatise that I will compose about these fundaments (dogma).”
So, in his youth (he was in his twenties when he wrote the Pirush Hamishna), Rambam had plans to write three books; one on Aggadah, one on the books of the prophets and one on the fundamental issues of Judaism. What happened to those plans?
Continuing the introduction to MN Rambam explains that as he started the project of explaining the Midrashim he faced a dilemma. He could not fully explain the real meaning of those Midrashim because that would thwart the original intent of keeping them secret. As further consideration he writes,
“We have further noticed that when an ignoramus among the multitude of Rabbanites reads these Midrashim, he will find no difficulty; inasmuch a rash fool, possessing no knowledge of the properties of things, will not reject statements which involve impossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: he takes them literally and thereby questions the abilities of the author and the soundness of his mind. He is doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the principles of our faith. Or he will acquiesce in assuming that the passages in question have some secret meaning, and he will continue to hold the author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory or not.”
YL points out Rambam’s surprising statement that by questioning the abilities of the author and the soundness of his mind, the religiously intelligent “is doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the principles of our faith”. He further contrasts it to Rambam’s statement on the same issue in his introduction to Chelek, twenty-five years earlier about these same people.
, והם כת ארורה שהתפרצו כלפי אנשים רמי המעלה שכבר נודעה חכמתם אצל החכמים.
"And they are an accursed group that has weighed in against people of high caliber whose wisdom is well known to the scholars." (For the whole quote in Hebrew, see the footnote).
An accursed group is quite different from “it not being opposed to the principles of our faith”. Comparing Rambam’s attitude towards the other two groups, the one that accepts the Midrashim as is, even when they violate logic and those who are advanced and understand them as allegories YL demonstrates a subtle change too. In the Pirush Hamishna the first group, those who insist and accept the Midrashim as literal are seen as insulting rather than respecting the rabbis by making them look foolish. He is quite vociferous saying that this group (which was quite widespread in his time and so it is the common Yeshivish stand nowadays) “destroys the beauty of the religion and darkens its splendor”. In MN however his tone is much milder; “inasmuch a rash fool, possessing no knowledge of the properties of things, will not reject statements which involve impossibilities”. It is a personal deficiency rather than an insult to the Rabbis. As to the third group, those who realize that the Midrashim are allegories for deep matters, in his Pirush Hamishna he offers them help while in MN he is satisfied with them knowing that there is an interpretation that might elude them.
Professor Loberbaum uses this analysis as the opening statement for his argument that Rambam’s opinion about Midrashim and Aggadah evolved. This in itself is not proof positive yet. First, we have to take into account the intended audience of the two works of Rambam. Pirush Hamishna was intended for the general public and MN to the sophisticated reader. YL dismisses this possibility though I do not find his argument conclusive. Second, Rambam tended to be much more polemical in his youth. However if it were for this alone, YL’s argument would not be very convincing. In upcoming posts, I will review some of his other proofs, some quite insightful and surprising.
Footnote:
פירוש המשנה לרמב"ם מסכת סנהדרין פרק י
והכת השניה גם הם רבים והם אותם שראו דברי חכמים או שמעוהו והבינוהו כפשטו, וחשבו שאין כונת חכמים בכך אלא משמעות פשטי הדברים, ולכן זלזלו בו וגנוהו וחשבו למוזר מה שאינו מוזר, וילעיגו על דברי חכמים לעתים קרובות, וחושבים שהם יותר נבונים מהם ויותר זכי רעיון, ושהם עליהם השלום פתיים חסרי דעת סכלים בכל המציאות, ואינם משיגים שום דבר כלל, ורוב מי שנפל במחשבה זו אותם הטוענים שהם רופאים, וההוזים במשפטי המזלות, לפי שהם לפי דמיונם פקחים חכמים פילוסופים וכמה רחוקים הם מן האנושות אצל הפילוסופים האמתיים. והם יותר סכלים מן הכת הראשונה ויותר פתים, והם כת ארורה שהתפרצו כלפי אנשים רמי המעלה שכבר נודעה חכמתם אצל החכמים. ואלו הכשירו את עצמם במדעים עד שידעו איך כותבים את הדברים בענינים האלהיים וכיוצא בהם מן המדעים להמון ולחכמים, ויסגלו לעצמם את החלק המעשי של הפילוסופיא, כי אז היו מבינים אם החכמים חכמים או לאו, והיו מובנים להם עניני דבריהם.
In the introduction to the Moreh, Rambam writes,
“In our commentary on the Mishna we stated our intention to explain difficult problems in the Book on Prophecy and in the Book of Harmony (Commentary according to Pines). In the latter we intended to examine all the passages in the Midrash which, if taken literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and common sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively.”
Rambam was planning two separate treatises, one dealing with the books of the Prophets and a separate one dealing with the rabbinical exegesis. In fact, in his introduction to Perek Chelek as part of his discussion of the seventh Ikar, he writes:
פירוש המשנה לרמב"ם מסכת סנהדרין פרק י
ולכן אניחנו למקומו או בספר ביאורי הדרשות שהבטחתי בו, או בספר הנבואה שהתחלתי לחברו, או בספר שאחבר בפירוש אלו היסודות
After telling us that it would take a lot to explain prophecy and how Moshe’s prophecy differs, Rambam writes,
“And I will leave it to write about it in its proper place, either in the treatise on the derashot (exegesis) which I promised, or the book on the prophets which I have already begun to write, or in a treatise that I will compose about these fundaments (dogma).”
So, in his youth (he was in his twenties when he wrote the Pirush Hamishna), Rambam had plans to write three books; one on Aggadah, one on the books of the prophets and one on the fundamental issues of Judaism. What happened to those plans?
Continuing the introduction to MN Rambam explains that as he started the project of explaining the Midrashim he faced a dilemma. He could not fully explain the real meaning of those Midrashim because that would thwart the original intent of keeping them secret. As further consideration he writes,
“We have further noticed that when an ignoramus among the multitude of Rabbanites reads these Midrashim, he will find no difficulty; inasmuch a rash fool, possessing no knowledge of the properties of things, will not reject statements which involve impossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: he takes them literally and thereby questions the abilities of the author and the soundness of his mind. He is doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the principles of our faith. Or he will acquiesce in assuming that the passages in question have some secret meaning, and he will continue to hold the author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory or not.”
YL points out Rambam’s surprising statement that by questioning the abilities of the author and the soundness of his mind, the religiously intelligent “is doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the principles of our faith”. He further contrasts it to Rambam’s statement on the same issue in his introduction to Chelek, twenty-five years earlier about these same people.
, והם כת ארורה שהתפרצו כלפי אנשים רמי המעלה שכבר נודעה חכמתם אצל החכמים.
"And they are an accursed group that has weighed in against people of high caliber whose wisdom is well known to the scholars." (For the whole quote in Hebrew, see the footnote).
An accursed group is quite different from “it not being opposed to the principles of our faith”. Comparing Rambam’s attitude towards the other two groups, the one that accepts the Midrashim as is, even when they violate logic and those who are advanced and understand them as allegories YL demonstrates a subtle change too. In the Pirush Hamishna the first group, those who insist and accept the Midrashim as literal are seen as insulting rather than respecting the rabbis by making them look foolish. He is quite vociferous saying that this group (which was quite widespread in his time and so it is the common Yeshivish stand nowadays) “destroys the beauty of the religion and darkens its splendor”. In MN however his tone is much milder; “inasmuch a rash fool, possessing no knowledge of the properties of things, will not reject statements which involve impossibilities”. It is a personal deficiency rather than an insult to the Rabbis. As to the third group, those who realize that the Midrashim are allegories for deep matters, in his Pirush Hamishna he offers them help while in MN he is satisfied with them knowing that there is an interpretation that might elude them.
Professor Loberbaum uses this analysis as the opening statement for his argument that Rambam’s opinion about Midrashim and Aggadah evolved. This in itself is not proof positive yet. First, we have to take into account the intended audience of the two works of Rambam. Pirush Hamishna was intended for the general public and MN to the sophisticated reader. YL dismisses this possibility though I do not find his argument conclusive. Second, Rambam tended to be much more polemical in his youth. However if it were for this alone, YL’s argument would not be very convincing. In upcoming posts, I will review some of his other proofs, some quite insightful and surprising.
Footnote:
פירוש המשנה לרמב"ם מסכת סנהדרין פרק י
והכת השניה גם הם רבים והם אותם שראו דברי חכמים או שמעוהו והבינוהו כפשטו, וחשבו שאין כונת חכמים בכך אלא משמעות פשטי הדברים, ולכן זלזלו בו וגנוהו וחשבו למוזר מה שאינו מוזר, וילעיגו על דברי חכמים לעתים קרובות, וחושבים שהם יותר נבונים מהם ויותר זכי רעיון, ושהם עליהם השלום פתיים חסרי דעת סכלים בכל המציאות, ואינם משיגים שום דבר כלל, ורוב מי שנפל במחשבה זו אותם הטוענים שהם רופאים, וההוזים במשפטי המזלות, לפי שהם לפי דמיונם פקחים חכמים פילוסופים וכמה רחוקים הם מן האנושות אצל הפילוסופים האמתיים. והם יותר סכלים מן הכת הראשונה ויותר פתים, והם כת ארורה שהתפרצו כלפי אנשים רמי המעלה שכבר נודעה חכמתם אצל החכמים. ואלו הכשירו את עצמם במדעים עד שידעו איך כותבים את הדברים בענינים האלהיים וכיוצא בהם מן המדעים להמון ולחכמים, ויסגלו לעצמם את החלק המעשי של הפילוסופיא, כי אז היו מבינים אם החכמים חכמים או לאו, והיו מובנים להם עניני דבריהם.
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